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Liability of online operators for user-generated content is a topical issue in Europe. The case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, which is currently 
pending before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, is one example of a situation where questions related 
to this issue are analysed. The First Section judgment finding the online news portal operator, Delfi, liable for defamatory user-
generated comments was widely criticised.  Moreover, other topical issue in Europe regards dissemination of cyber hate. This thesis 
combines these two elements and seeks to answer the following question: Which online entities, if any of them, are liable for the 
dissemination of user-generated cyber hate? The analysis is limited to the approach of the Council of Europe, although the rules and 
principles adopted in the United States are referred to due to their trendsetter status.  
 
Freedom of expression is protected by Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention. According to the rules and principles 
adopted in the framework of the Council, this Article does not protect ‘hate speech’ or its online version ‘cyber hate’. However, there 
exists no clear definition of ‘hate speech’. In the strategies adopted by different Council bodies and in the case-law of the Court, 
several categories of speech have been considered as ‘hate speech’. However, this practice has been neither clear nor consistent. 
This is especially regrettable noting that, according to the Court’s case-law, ‘hate speech’ can be categorically excluded from the 
protection of Article 10 by using the probation of the abuse of rights clause provided for in Article 17 of the Convention. In the course 
of this research, I come to oppose said the application of said Article due to the unnecessary risks it poses on the enjoyment of 
freedom of expression. Moreover, I strongly endorse the adoption of a legally binding definition of the central notion.  
 
Concerning liability issues, in the case-law of the Court, the media has been afforded special protection under Article 10. On the 
other hand, this protection is coupled with responsibilities. Therefore, professional journalists have been held liable even for 
dissemination of third-party content. The central elements analysed by the Court when imposing such liability in printed media cases 
have been the amount of editorial control and the intent of the journalist. Due to their functions, some online operators have been 
assimilated to these traditional media actors. They are considered content providers. However, so-called Internet service providers 
are a category of online operators regarded as intermediary or auxiliary entities. These entities enjoy a limited liability regime. Again, 
the key in making this distinction between content providers and ISPs is the amount of editorial control over the content the respective 
entity hosts, transmits or allows to access. Extensive control over information is coupled with wider liability.  
 
In the case of Delfi, the First Section of the Court concluded that due to the amount of control practiced by Delfi, it was to be regarded 
as a content provider. I agree with the main parts of the Court’s analysis. Furthermore, the liability related principles adopted by the 
Court in this case can be applied in relation to ‘cyber hate’ cases, although the criminal nature of these cases allows the primary 
liability to be imposed also on the actual authors of the content. I consider that in order for the Council’s fight against ‘hate speech’ 
to be effective, additional liability should be imposed on content providers and, in specific circumstances, even on ISPs. I endorse 
the mobilization of and co-operation with the relevant private sector actors to form guidelines on self-regulatory measures they could 
apply in order to comply with their duties. Accordingly, the suggested answer to the question posed in the beginning of this research 
is that all online operators can be liable for user-generated ‘cyber hate’ in case they neglect their respective responsibilities. In the 
future, the aim of the Council should be to try to hinder any attempts by these entities to rely on the so-called wilful blindness. 
However, any liabilities imposed must be assessed on case-by-cases basis, taking the circumstances of the specific cases into 
account, and respecting the inherent principles of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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II 
 
 
It once seemed easier to ignore the haters among us. They held furtive meetings in out-
of-the-way places, wrote racist screeds in the guise of bad novels, and when they 
appeared in public, they wore hoods to hide their faces. Now, they apply for admission 
to the bar, stand for elected office, appear on radio and television talk shows, and 
increasingly take their message to the mainstream by using the Internet.  
Paul McMasters, 19991 
  
                                                 
1 McMasters, Paul, ‘Must a Civil Society Be a Censored Society?’, 26 Human Rights (1999), 8–10, at 8. 
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INTRODUCTION: WHO IS LIABLE FOR CYBER HATE? 
 Starting Point 
Research question 
In recent years, newspapers at both a local and international level have informed us of the 
new popularity gained by extremist thoughts around the globe.2 To some extent this 
victorious march has been enabled by the mainstream use of new information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), the flagship of which is the Internet. By making 
ideologies easily spreadable and available to wider audiences than ever before, the Internet 
has undoubtedly brought with it great benefits, and not least to the enforcement of freedom 
of speech. However, these benefits come with a downside, as some groups have begun to 
use the Internet as a platform to undermine others. 
I first started to consider the legal side of this issue in the autumn of 2013, when I participated 
in the European Human Rights Moot Court Competition organized by the European Law 
Students’ Association in cooperation with the Council of Europe (hereinafter ‘the Council’).3 
The hypothetical case we had to plead in the competition was based on the law of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter 
‘European Convention on Human Rights’, ‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’), and concentrated 
on online ‘hate speech’.4 It was inspired by an actual defamation case currently pending 
                                                 
2 YLE, ‘Viharyhmät yleistyneet Facebookissa ja YouTubessa’, YLE Uutiset, 14 May 2009, available at 
<http://yle.fi/uutiset/viharyhmat_yleistyneet_facebookissa_ja_youtubessa/5251618>, 4 January 2015; 
Severson, Kim, ‘Number of U.S. Hate Groups Is Rising, Report Says’, The New York Times, 7 March 2012, 
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/us/number-of-us-hate-groups-on-the-rise-report-
says.html?_r=0>, 4 January 2015; and Gude, Hubert; Popp, Maximilian; and Schindler, Jörg, ‘Right-Wing 
Extremism: Germany’s New Islamophobia Boom’; translation by Rogers, Thomas; Spiegel Online 
International, 5 March 2014, available at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/islamophobic-hate-
groups-become-more-prominent-in-germany-a-956801.html>, 4 January 2015. 
3 The Council of Europe was established after the Second World War, on 5 May 1949. It started as a post-war 
attempt to unify Europe against new forms of totalitarianism. The Council currently consists of 47 Member 
States. See Harris, David; O’Boyle, Michael; and Warbrick, Colin, Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Butterworths, Chatham, 1995), at 1; and Ovey, Clare and White, Robin, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The 
European Convention on Human Rights (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010), at 5–7. 
4 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4 
November 1950, in force 3 September 1953, European Treaty Series No. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 14 
(amending the control system of the Convention, Strasbourg, 13 May 2004, in force 1 June 2010, European 
Treaty Series No. 194) as from the date of its entry into force on 1 June 2010. All new members of the Council 
are required to accede this Convention. It reflects the aims and concerns that led to the establishment of the 
Council. It guarantees mainly civil and political rights, with the exemptions of Protocol No.1 Articles 1 (right 
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before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Court’ 
or ‘ECtHR’): Delfi AS v. Estonia.5 The central issue analysed by the Court in this case is 
whether the imposing of civil liability for defamatory user-generated content is a 
disproportionate interference with a news portal operator’s (Delfi) freedom of expression. 
This case demonstrates that questions regarding online liability are current in Europe today. 
Moreover, the recent news from home and abroad have shown that the issues regarding 
online ‘hate speech’ or ‘cyber hate’ should be taken seriously. The question is not of 
offending words but of content with the potential to incite actual violence.6 Accordingly, my 
aim in this research is to combine these two elements and try to find an answer to the 
following question: Who is liable for ‘cyber hate’? 
Freedom of expression and hate speech 
‘Hate speech’ is a form of speech. Freedom of speech or expression, on the other hand, is 
recognized as a ‘human right’ and protected in all universal and regional human rights 
instruments.7 By definition, ‘human rights’ are universal and inalienable rights belonging to 
every human in virtue of their humanity. ‘Human rights’ are distinct from general ‘rights’, 
because they are ‘not acquired, nor can they be transferred, disposed of or extinguished by 
any act or event’.8 However, all rights come with exceptions. These exceptions are essential 
                                                 
to property) and 2 (right to education). For more detailed analysis see, for example, Ovey & White, The 
European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3. 
5 Delfi AS v. Estonia, Application no. 64569/09, 10 October 2013 (Referral to the Grand Chamber 17 February 
2014). The permanent European Court of Human Rights was established by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention 
on 1 November 1998. It consists of a number of judges equal to the number of the Council’s Member States, 
and its principal role is to pronounce on applications brought by the Member States and individuals under the 
Convention. Its judgments are legally binding on the respondent States. For more detailed analysis see, for 
example, Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, especially at 20–52. 
6 One example are the actions of a Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik in July 2011. He 
killed 77 people by planting a bomb in Oslo centre and by shooting participants of a summer camp organized 
by the youth wing of Norway's Labour party. According to his own words, his motivation was to wake people 
up to see the ‘systematic deconstruction of the Norwegian and European culture’ from multiculturalism. See 
Pidd, Helen, ‘Anders Behring Breivik describes Utøya massacre to Oslo court’, the Guardian, 20 April 2012, 
available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/20/anders-behring-breivik-massacre-court>, 4 
January 2015. Recently, ‘hate speech’ has been discussed in the press due to the attacks on the French satirical 
newspaper Charlie Hebdo and a seminar discussing art and blasphemy in Copenhagen. See on this discussion 
for example the opinion of Ginsberg, Jodie, ‘The right to free speech means nothing without the right to offend’, 
the Guardian, 16 February 2015, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/16/free-
speech-means-nothing-without-right-to-offend-paris-copenhagen>, 20 February 2015. 
7 See, inter alia, Article 10 ECHR; United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New 
York, 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976, 999 United Nations Treaty Series 171, Article 19; 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, ‘PACT OF SAN JOSE, COSTA 
RICA’, San Jose, 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978, Organization of American States Treaty Series 
No. 36, Article 13; and Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 27 
June 1981, in force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Article 9. 
8 In this context, it should be noted that although there is no hierarchy of ‘human rights’, some of them are 
regarded as ‘absolute’ meaning that they allow no derogations. Examples of such rights include, inter alia, 
prohibition of torture and prohibition of slavery. Moreover, some rights that are not ‘absolute’ in the 
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for the rights to endure ‘the uncertainties of the future’.9 Therefore, even ‘human rights’ have 
boundaries. Firstly, most of these rights are subject to ‘restrictions and limitations to 
accommodate the rights of others’.10 Secondly, some of them can be derogated during the 
time of war or emergency.11 Finally, some rights can be restricted in very specific 
circumstances or in order to secure certain interests.12 It is important to highlight, however, 
that the principle of the ‘rule of law’ requires that all restrictions and limitations to these 
rights must be clear, affirmative, and applied in ‘good faith’.13 Thus, these restrictions and 
limitations are often expressly authorized by the same instruments where the relevant 
‘human rights’ are guaranteed. 
Accordingly, freedom of expression has its limitations and, therefore, even if ‘hate speech’ 
was protected as a part of this right, this protection would not be absolute. However, it is not 
clear whether ‘hate speech’ is a protected form of expression. At least in some instances it 
has been left outside of any protection. The most central provision in this regard is Article 4 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), adopted in 1965 by the United Nations (UN).14 In this provision, the State Parties 
to ICERD express their condemnation of ‘all propaganda and all organisations which are 
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or 
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any 
form’. Moreover, the provision requires State Parties, inter alia, to declare as an offence 
punishable by law ‘all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts 
                                                 
aforementioned sense are referred to as ‘core’ or ‘fundamental’ rights meaning that their protection is a 
precondition for the protection of other rights. Such are, inter alia, right to life and right to liberty. See Ovey & 
White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 9; and Sieghart, Paul, The International Law of 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 1983), at 17 and 19. 
9 Petman, Jarna, Human Rights and Violence: the hope and the fear of the liberal world (University of Helsinki, 
2012), at 182–183. Petman uses the example of freedom of association. The drafters of this right, or any right 
for that matter, could not predict all cases it should cover in the future. See also Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘The 
Effect of Rights on Political Culture’ in Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 99–116, at 110–111. 
10 Sieghart, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 87. Other rights protected as ‘human rights’ and relevant in the 
context of this analysis include, inter alia, right to private life, freedom of religion, and the right not to be 
discriminated. See, inter alia, Articles 8, 9 and 14 ECHR. 
11 See for derogations Article 15 ECHR. 
12 See for special circumstances Article 2(2) ECHR, and for certain interests Articles 8–11 ECHR. 
13 This is one of the basic principles of international law. See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, 1155 United Nations Treaty Series 331, Article 
31(1). See also Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 127 and 308–312; and 
Sieghart, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 19. 
14 United Nations, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, New 
York, 7 March 1966, in force 4 January 1969, 660 United Nations Treaty Series 195. 
4 
 
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision 
of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof’. However, although 
there are 87 Signatories to ICERD, many of them, and perhaps most notably the United 
States of America (hereinafter ‘US’ or ‘the United States’), have made reservations to the 
applicability of Article 4.15 Paradoxically, this is mainly due to the heavy restrictions 
imposed by said provision on freedom of speech. Accordingly, there seems to be no 
universally accepted stand regarding ‘hate speech’.  
Liability for wrongful conduct 
As mentioned above, I am particularly interested in questions concerning liability. Another 
distinction between general rights and ‘human rights’ is that ‘human rights’ impose duties 
only on States and public authorities, and not on other individuals.16 However, the States’ 
obligations following from the ‘human rights’ instruments usually include a positive 
obligation to try to hinder infringements of rights of individuals by other individuals.17 Thus, 
in its domestic legislation, a Member State might need to criminalize acts or impose 
liabilities also on private entities in order to effectively fulfil this obligation. This is called 
the ‘indirect’ or ‘horizontal’ effect of ‘human rights’.18 My aim is to discover to whom, if 
anyone, the authorities could (or should) impose liabilities with regard to the dissemination 
of ‘hate speech’. In this research, I will focus on the more complex and current issues 
regarding the liability for content created by a third party. I am particularly interested in the 
                                                 
15 United Nations, Treaty collection, ICERD, available at  
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV2&chapter=4&lang=en>, 3 
January 2015. 
16 Sieghart, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 17.  
17 Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 99–102. See, for example, Article 1 
ECHR. The Court has found a violation when a Member State has failed to take actions in order to guarantee 
to those within its jurisdiction protection of their Convention rights. The Court has stated the following about 
the positive obligations: ‘In determining the scope of a State's positive obligations, regard must be had to the 
fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual, the diversity 
of situations obtaining in Contracting States and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and 
resources. Nor must these obligations be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden.’ See the case of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Application no. 48787/99, 
[GC] 8 July 2004. 
18 Hirvelä, Päivi and Heikkilä, Satu, Ihmisoikeudet – käsikirja EIT:n oikeuskäytäntöön (Edita, Porvoo, 2013), 
at 598. In this connection, it is necessary to briefly discuss the applicability of ‘drittwirkung’. It is a German 
term and refers to the liability of individuals. It is generally recognized that the Convention does not entail a 
degree of ‘drittwirkung’. It only imposes obligations on Member States. Thus, the Convention touches the 
conduct of private persons only indirectly when action is taken by the respective State in order to secure the 
protection of Convention rights, for example, by prohibiting certain actions by individuals. See Harris, David; 
O’Boyle, Michael; and Warbrick, Colin, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd Edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2009), at 18–21; Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 
3, at 99–102; and Sieghart, Human Rights, supra note 8, at 34–44. For more detailed analysis on human rights 
in private sphere see Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford University Press, 1993) 
especially at 189–149 and 178–244, and on ‘drittwirkung’ at 188–206. 
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liability of online operators for user-generated content. Due to the circumstances inherent to 
the case of Delfi, I will concentrate especially on the liability of an online news portal 
operator allowing user comments. 
Outlining my research 
Accordingly, two separate but overlapping components form the basis of my legal analysis: 
(i) position on ‘cyber hate’; and (ii) position on online liability. I will focus my research on 
the approach of the Council. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, to date human rights 
have been ‘most fully and systematically developed’ under the law of the ECHR.19 Secondly, 
after ICERD failed to achieve a universal stand on ‘hate speech’, the European countries 
began to take action to form at least a European consensus on the issue, and the task of 
drafting a uniform European law was given to the Council of Europe.20 However, it should 
be noted that discourse concerning this topic was first started in the United States. Hence, 
after introducing some central actors of online environment and the case that inspired me to 
start this research (Delfi), I will briefly analyse the relevant US legal discourse and praxis. 
The findings of this analysis will then be compared to the European approaches in the course 
of this research.21 After this Introduction Chapter, my research is divided into two Parts. In 
Part I, I will turn my attention to the Council of Europe and the principles established by it 
regarding liability for ‘hate speech’. I will begin by defining and outlining the scope of two 
key concepts: freedom of expression and ‘hate speech’. I will then analyse the different 
strategies adopted by the Council discussing both treaty-based and standard-setting texts but 
concentrating especially on the case-law of the Court, where these strategies are interpreted 
and enforced. The aim of Part I is to reveal the relevant rules and principles established 
before the emergence of cyberspace. Part II of this research, in turn, focuses on the Internet. 
I will begin by assessing the more recent strategies adopted by the Council, but my focus 
will again be on the case-law of the Court. After analysing some seminal Internet-related 
cases, I will turn my attention to the Court’s judgment in the case of Delfi.22 Although Delfi 
is a defamation case, it is highly relevant for my analysis because it deals with online liability 
issues. Accordingly, I will analyse the different arguments presented regarding this case and 
then propose my own hypothesis of its outcome in light of the findings of this research. 
                                                 
19 See Ovey, Clare and White, Robin, Jacobs and White, The European Convention on Human Rights (4th 
edition, Oxford University Press, 2006), at 3. 
20 Van Blarcum, Christopher, ‘“Internet Hate Speech”: The European Framework and the Emerging American 
Haven’, 62 Washington and Lee Law Review (2005), 781–830, at 787. 
21 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5. 
22 Ibid. 
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Finally, under Concluding Remarks, I will discuss the applicability of the Delfi judgement 
to ‘cyber hate’ cases and present my own remarks and suggestions with this regard. 
Hopefully, I will be able to conclude by answering the question posed in the title of this 
Introduction Chapter. Let the journey begin.   
7 
 
 Background for Analysis 
 Introducing Internet 
2.1.1 Explosion and exploitation 
In most western countries the legal doctrine regarding traditional or classical media was 
firmly set in the early 90’s. However, what was not foreseen was the explosion of the 
Internet. It got into mainstream use and started growing at unparalleled speed in the 
beginning of the 90’s starting from the United States.23 This has been referred to as ‘the most 
important development in communications technology since the printing revolution’.24 
Where it took radio broadcasters 38 years to reach an audience of 50 million people, the 
television made it in 13 years, but for the Internet it only took four years.25 One component 
in particular enabled this march – namely the World Wide Web.26 After the Internet had 
catapulted itself into mainstream use, its central role in the exchange of ideas by many 
became evident. However, simultaneously, it became apparent that the abuse of the same 
would grow an increasingly serious problem.27 Traditional views on freedom of expression 
had not foreseen this kind of a challenge. Hence, a slow adaption process begun and, to some 
extent, still continues today. 
The central characteristics of the Internet as a medium of communication are (i) the low cost 
of creating and consulting content, (ii) the instant nature of content dissemination, (iii) the 
lack of any ‘editorial control’, (iv) the interactivity of the medium, and (v) the durability of 
the published information.28 With these features, the Internet empowers free speech. 
However, the ‘anonymity, immediacy and global nature of the Internet’ also make it the 
                                                 
23 Greenberg, Sally, ‘Threats, Harassment and Hate On-Line: Recent Developments’, 6 Boston University 
Public Interest Law Journal (1997), 673–701, at 673. 
24 Barendt, Eric, Freedom of Speech (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2005), at 451. 
25 United Nations, ‘United Nations Cyberschoolbus: Information and Communications technology’ 
<http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/>, 20 October 2014. 
26 The World Wide Web was invented in 1989 by Tim Berners-Lee, a scientist working at CERN, Switzerland. 
It is a software required, along with a basic browser and a library of code, to run a web server. It was put in 
public domain in 1993. See on this O’Luanaigh, Gian, ‘World Wide Web born at CERN 25 years ago’, 8 April 
2014, available at <http://home.web.cern.ch/about/updates/2014/03/world-wide-web-born-cern-25-years-
ago>, 4 January 2015. See also Greenberg, ‘Threats, Harassment and Hate On-Line: Recent Developments’, 
supra note 23, at 685; and Hoffman, David, Web of Hate: Extremists Exploit the Internet, (Anti-Defamation 
League of B’nai B’rith, New York, 1996), at 3. 
27 Gilbert, Jonathan, ‘Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse’, 54 Fordham Law Review, 
(1985–1986), 439–454, at 441. 
28 Vajić, Nina and Voyatziz, Panayotis ‘The Internet and Freedom of Expression: a “Brave New World” and 
the ECtHR’s Evolving Case-law’ in Casadevall, Josep; Myjer, Egbert; O’Boyle, Michael; and Austin, Anna 
(eds.), Freedom of Expression: Essays in honour of Nicholas Bratza (Wolf Legal Publishers, Oisterwijk, 2012), 
391–407, at 392–393.  
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perfect tool for promotion of extremist thoughts.29 One group of people exploiting this 
possibility are hate-mongers, who achieved real success in the United States after being able 
to recruit new members and spread their views online. The Internet made it possible for them 
to reach larger audiences with considerable ease, effectively creating a whole new market 
for their propaganda.30 Today, anyone owning a computer can set up their own website or a 
blog or simply start communicating via social media.31 This has also affected the traditional 
media professionals. They are now sharing their field with (and to some extent competing 
against) the so-called ‘new media entities’ many of whom operate by their own rules. This 
has obvious benefits regarding democratization of society and public discourse, but the by-
product, the so-called ‘low level digital speech’, brings with it great challenges including 
questions concerning liability.32  
2.1.2 Online operators 
I created the following diagram to demonstrate the central actors of the online environment 
and their online relationships:  
 
 
In this diagram, ‘cyber hate’, or more precisely the liability for it, is the element moving 
from entity to entity. The relevant act is making ‘cyber hate’ available to the public online, 
                                                 
29 Banks, James, ‘European Regulation of Cross-Border Hate Speech in Cyberspace: the Limits of Legislation’, 
19 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2011), 1–13, at 3. 
30 Greenberg, ‘Threats, Harassment and Hate On-Line: Recent Developments’, supra note 23, at 686–687; and 
Hoffmann, Web of Hate, supra note 26, at 22. See also Siegel, Michael, ‘Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the 
Internet: The Jurisdictional and Human Rights Nightmare’, 9 Albany Law Journal of Science & Technology 2 
(1999), 375–398, at 381; and Weintraub-Reiter, Rachel, ‘Hate Speech over the Internet: a Traditional 
Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?’, 8 Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 
(1998–1999), 145–173, at 146. 
31 McGonagle, Tarlach, ‘The Council of Europe against online hate speech: Conundrums and challenges’, 
Expert paper for Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Media and Information Society, 
Belgrade, 7–8 November 2013, MCM(2013)005, at 26. 
32 McGonagle, ‘The Council of Europe against Online Hate Speech’, supra note 31, at 26. 
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and the key question is the following: Which entity, if any, is liable for it? The diagram 
illustrates a hypothetical situation where a user-generated ‘cyber hate’ comment – a 
comment made by a non-professional Internet user and not, for example, by a journalist in 
his or her professional capacity – has been posted. Today, this kind of comment could appear, 
inter alia, on a comment platform operated by a professional news portal or on a web-blog. 
If it is decided that comments of this nature are not permitted, and someone must be held 
responsible for them, the most obvious answer is to impose liability on their originators. 
However, if the aim is to uproot all ‘hate speech’, this measure mainly opting at 
compensating for damage already caused might not be a sufficiently effective. 
What about the entity that offered the means to post the hateful comment? Should 
responsibility lie with the operator of the news portal or the private website? If the latter 
entities themselves had published wrongful material, for example in the form of a news 
article or a blog post, they could be regarded as ‘content providers’ and thus responsible for 
the content they produce.33 However, when the entity behind the wrongful comment is an 
anonymous third party, and the website operator is just a ‘host’ to this content, deciding on 
liability is more difficult. Where to draw a line? Should the website operator have reacted to 
the wrongful content in order to avoid liability? Other option could be to impose a form of 
‘strict liability’ meaning that the operator would be held liable regardless of its actions 
because it enabled the comment to be made in the first place.34 Then, why restrict the liability 
only on the website operator? Following the principle of ‘strict liability’, the entity allowing 
access to the website could also be held liable. 
In this context, an important term to define is ‘Internet service providers’ (ISPs). It is a 
category of online operators. There exists no clear definition of ISPs, but their common 
nominator is that they are ‘intermediaries’ that ‘disseminate or facilitate access to media or 
media-like content’.35 According to Article 1 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cybercrime (hereinafter ‘the Cybercrime Convention’), ‘service provider’ is, (i) ‘any public 
or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of 
a computer system’; and (ii) ‘any other entity that processes or stores computer data on 
                                                 
33 However, sometimes even in these situations it might be difficult to identify the author. It is quite common 
to encounter blogs and private websites hosted by anonymous operators. 
34 See in this context the case of K.U. v Finland, Application no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008.  
35 Jakubowicz, Karol, ‘A new notion of media?’, Background text for Action Plan of the 1st Council of Europe 
Conference of Ministers Responsible for Media and New Communication Services, Reykjavik, 28–29 May 
2009, MCM(2009)011. 
10 
 
behalf of such communication service or users of such service’.36 In practice ISPs, therefore, 
carry out very different tasks on online environment. Their actions may entail, inter alia, 
‘providing access to communication networks, transmitting data and hosting information’.37 
In my hypothetical example, there are several entities that could be considered as ISPs. First, 
the ‘news portal operator’ could be regarded as an ISP with regard to the comment platform 
it hosts and as such it could be called a ‘host provider’. The same might apply to the ‘private 
website operator’ allowing user-generated content. On the other hand, as mentioned above, 
these two might also be regarded as ‘content providers’. Then, central questions entail the 
following: Is a ‘content provider’ also an ISP? How to differentiate a ‘host provider’ from a 
‘content provider’? Is this distinction relevant from the liability point of view? Finally, there 
are the entity offering a service for website hosting and the entity enabling access to the 
website. What about these entities: are they ISPs, and what are their liabilities? These are all 
questions analysed in connection to the case of Delfi.38 
2.1.3 Introducing Delfi AS v. Estonia 
The case of Delfi concerns one of the largest Internet news portals in Estonia, which 
publishes up to 330 news articles a day.39 In January 2006, an article was published on Delfi 
featuring the controversial decision of a ferry company to change its routes, and thus to 
destroy winter ice roads between the mainland and various islands. The article attracted 185 
comments in the comment platform attached to the portal. About twenty of these comments 
contained personal threats and offensive language directed against the majority shareholder 
of the ferry company. Six weeks later the defamed person requested Delfi to remove the 
offensive comments and claimed damages. The comments were removed on the same day, 
but the claim for damages was refused.40 The shareholder brought civil proceedings against 
Delfi, but his initial claim was dismissed. The County Court found that Delfi’s responsibility 
was excluded under the domestic law based on the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (hereinafter ‘EU E-
                                                 
36 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 November 2001, in force 1 July 2004, 
European Treaty Series No. 185. 
37 See the Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, adopted on 28 May 2003 at the 840 th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, and its Explanatory Report regarding Principle 6. 
38 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5. 
39 Ibid, § 7. 
40 Ibid, §§ 12–23. 
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Commerce Directive’).41 It concluded, first of all, that the comment platform was to be 
distinguished from the portal’s journalistic area. Moreover, Delfi’s administration of the 
comments was essentially of a mechanical and passive nature and thus it could not be 
considered the publisher of the comments. It was a ‘host provider’ with no liability for the 
user-generated comments and no obligation to monitor them. The Court of Appeal, however, 
considered that the County Court had erred. The defamed party eventually obtained a final 
judgment against Delfi in June 2009 and was awarded approximately 320 euros in non-
pecuniary damages.42  
The central element leading to the domestic judgment was the establishment of Delfi as a 
‘content provider’ with the same responsibilities as a traditional printed media publisher. 
The domestic courts viewed that an ‘information society service provider’, in the meaning 
of domestic law and the EU E-Commerce Directive, has neither knowledge of nor control 
over the information which is transmitted or stored in its services.43 In contrast, a ‘provider 
of content services’ or a ‘content provider’ governs the content of information that it stores. 
Thus, at least the Estonian courts are of the opinion that, unlike a ‘host provider’, a ‘content 
provider’ is not an ISP. This gives a crucial role to the criteria used in order to differentiate 
these entities. With regard to Delfi, the domestic courts emphasized that it had practiced 
‘editorial control’ over the comments. It had, for example, enacted ‘house rules’ and 
removed any comments breaching those rules. On the contrary, the authors could not amend 
or delete their comments after they had been posted. Thus, Delfi had the sole power to decide 
which comments were published. This power, analogous to the classical form of ‘editorial 
control’, imposed liability for the published content on Delfi.44 In December 2009, Delfi 
complained to the ECtHR claiming an infringement of its right to freedom of expression as 
provided for in Article 10 ECHR.45 In Part II, I will analyse the judgment of the Court.46  
                                                 
41 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects 
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 17 July 2000, Official 
Journal of the European Union L 178. 
42 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5, §§ 17–26. 
43 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 41. 
44 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5, § 27. 
45 Ibid, §§ 1 and 46. 
46 See in Part II, Section 3.3.2.2 Delfi AS v. Estonia. 
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 Early Discourse in United States 
Before starting my analysis of the Council of Europe, I will briefly assess the rules and 
principles adopted in the United States regarding the position on allowing ‘hate speech’ and 
the questions regarding online liability. 
2.2.1 Approach to hate speech 
The stand on traditional forms of ‘hate speech’ had been established in the United States 
decades before the surfacing of online ‘hate sites’. First Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States of America (hereinafter ‘the First Amendment’ or ‘the First Amendment 
of the US Constitution’) provides strong protection for freedom of speech.47 In principle, 
there are only two situations where ‘hate speech’ could fall outside the scope of this 
protection: (i) if it constitutes ‘fighting words’ or (ii) if it constitutes ‘a true threat’.48  
The ‘fighting words’ exception was established in the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
where an individual was convicted for using offensive and derogatory names about a police 
officer.49 In its opinion, the Federal Supreme Court (hereinafter ‘the Supreme Court’) states 
that the First Amendment does not protect ‘fighting words’ meaning words which ‘by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace’.50 Later, this 
doctrine was tested by the case of R.A.V v. the City of St. Paul concerning the conviction of 
a white extremist for burning a cross on a black family’s property.51 This case raised the 
following question: Should racist speech be treated as ‘fighting words’? In this case, the 
Supreme Court unanimously decided that the relevant State ordinance prohibiting the display 
of a symbol that ‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion or gender’ was unconstitutional because it prohibited only a certain type of 
                                                 
47 United States of America, Constitution of the United States of America, 17 September 1787, in force 21 June 
1788, 1 Statutes at Large: Organic Law of the United States 10–20; and United States of America, Constitution 
of the United States of America, Amendment I, 25 September 1789, in force 15 December 1791, 1 Statutes at 
Large: Organic Laws of the United States 21. The First Amendment stands as follows: ‘Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for 
a redress of grievances.’ 
48 Van Blarcum, ‘“Internet Hate Speech”’, supra note 20, at 809. 
49 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), 9 March 1942. 
50 Ibid, at 571–572. The following is stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion: ‘There are certain well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention…and punishment of which has never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, and the 
insulting or “fighting” words -- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ 
51 R.A.V v. the City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), 22 June 1992. 
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speech on the basis of its subject. The ‘fighting words’ exemption could not be used to 
discriminate against certain types of opinions. 52 The key requirement for the application of 
this exemption is the existence of incitement to lawless action. 
The ‘true threat’ exception, on the other hand, was established in the classical case of 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court adopted a very strict approach against 
criminal punishments for any speech attacking racial or religious groups.53 In its opinion, the 
Supreme Court unanimously holds that the defendants, members of the Ku Klux Klan, who 
had made derogatory statements about blacks and Jews in a televised rally, could not be 
convicted since it had not been shown that they had incited ‘imminent lawless action’ and 
no proof existed that such action would occur.54 Accordingly, also here the Supreme Court 
drew a line between ‘advocating violence’ and ‘inciting to violence’, the latter not being 
protected by the First Amendment.55 Legal actions under ‘true threat’ exemption are allowed 
solely against speech that is intended to incite imminent lawlessness, and is likely to succeed 
in it.56  
In the context of my research, the relevant question is whether the aforementioned 
established principles concerning classical forms of expression also apply to the Internet. 
The first relevant case in this regard is the case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), where the Supreme Court was called to assess the constitutionality of two 
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), enacted by the United States 
Congress in 1996.57 The CDA aims to censor online pornography and other material 
inappropriate for children’s eyes. The provisions analysed by the Supreme Court 
criminalized the display of ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive’ online communications.58 The 
Supreme Court found these provisions to be unconstitutional due to two main reasons: 
firstly, the terminology used was unconstitutionally vague; and, secondly, by seeking to 
completely prevent the online publishing of certain type of content, the provisions 
constituted an unacceptable content-based blanket restriction on speech. In addition, in its 
                                                 
52 Ibid, at 2–3. See Van Blarcum, ‘“Internet Hate Speech”’, supra note 20, at 814. 
53 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), 9 June 1969. 
54 Lewis, Anthony, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment (Basic Books, 
New York, 2007), at 159. 
55 Rosenfeld, Michael, ‘Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis in Herz, 
Michael and Molnar, Peter (eds.), The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and 
Responses (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 242–289, at 253–254. 
56 Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate, supra note 54, at 162. 
57 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), 26 June 1997. United States of America, 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, PUBLIC LAW 104–104, 8 February 1996, 110 STAT. 133. 
58 Ibid, § 230, 47 USC 230. 
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opinion the Supreme Court notes that as a criminal statute with penalties such as up to two 
years of imprisonment, the CDA could have a ‘chilling effect’ meaning that it could ‘cause 
speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and 
images’.59 Accordingly, applying the ‘fundamental premise of constitutional law’ to the 
Internet, the Supreme Court ruled that ‘the interest of encouraging freedom of expression in 
a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship’.60 Thus, 
in Reno the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment protection to all Internet 
communication.61 Accordingly, after Reno and as an extension of R.A.V, the Supreme Court 
has been able to strike down all attempts to categorically limit ‘cyber hate’. The First 
Amendment protects all speech equally regardless of where it occurs. However, this means 
that the same protection exemptions apply online. 
Although it might seem difficult to apply the ‘true threat’ exemption online, the existing 
case-law proves this to be possible. The relevant case in this regard is the case of Planned 
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. America Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA).62 
This case concerned a situation where ACLA had published a list of doctors providing 
abortion services and their addresses on its website.63 Three of the doctors on the list were 
murdered. Following this, the murdered doctors’ names were crossed out in black on 
ACLA’s website, whereas the names of the doctors who had been injured by attackers were 
highlighted in grey.64 In its ruling, the Circuit Court concludes that the website and the 
information contained in it constituted a ‘true threat’. The defendants ought to have known 
that the identified doctors would feel threatened by this sort of a ‘hit list’.65 Thus, the First 
Amendment did not protect this online content.66 Accordingly, due to the First Amendment 
doctrine, ‘cyber hate’ cannot be restricted, however, when such online speech forms 
‘fighting words’ or a ‘true threat’ it is not protected by the Constitution.  
                                                 
59 Reno v. ACLU, supra note 57, § 2345. See Weintraub-Reiter, ‘Hate Speech over the Internet’, supra note 30, 
at 158–161. 
60 Reno v. ACLU, supra note 57, §§ 2329 and 2351. 
61 Siegel, ‘Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the Internet’, supra note 30, at 388; and Weintraub-Reiter, ‘Hate 
Speech over the Internet’, supra note 30, at 168. 
62 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. America Coalition of Life Activists (en banc), 290 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2002), 7 July 2006. 
63 Ibid, §§ 1064–1065. 
64 Ibid, §§ 1063–1064, and 1080. 
65 Ibid, § 1088. 
66 Ibid, § 1086. See on this judgment also Van Blarcum, ‘“Internet Hate Speech”’, supra note 20, at 810–811. 
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2.2.2 Approach to liability for user misuse 
Liability for wrongful content was one of the first Internet-related questions to be discussed 
among the US legal scholars.67 Due to the afore-described approach on ‘hate speech’, the 
discussion concentrated mainly on liability for libel or copyright infringements. This, 
however, does not undermine the relevance of said discussion for the present analysis. 
Mainly following from the problems inherent to identifying the originators of wrongful 
content, the emphasis of the discussion was on finding a way to prevent misuse of online 
platforms altogether and, in observed cases of wrongful content, on ensuring adequate 
compensation for the victims. However, for example Jonathan Gilbert argued that the 
imposition of some liability on the website operators allowing user-generated content should 
be considered ‘both as a source of compensation for victims and as a means of deterring 
misuse’.68  
2.2.2.1 Traditional media 
Traditionally, in the United States’ legal praxis regarding liability issues, the emphasis has 
been on distinguishing different roles of the entities involved in the publication. According 
to these established principles, there are three categories of relevant entities. The first 
category is the ‘primary publishers’, who are held fully liable for the content they publish. 
This category includes traditional forms of magazines, newspapers, as well as the authors of 
the respective articles.69 Next, there are the ‘secondary publishers’, who are considered to 
have a form of ‘qualified privilege’ meaning that they are held liable only if they ‘knew or 
should have known’ of the wrongful character of the information they transmitted. Classic 
examples of entities belonging to this group include bookstores and news dealers.70 Lastly, 
there is the group of entities that pass information along but are not considered publishers 
and thus are not held liable for any content.71 The idea is that ‘one who merely makes 
available to another equipment or facilities that he may use himself for general 
communication purposes’ should not be held liable for publication. This rule applies even if 
                                                 
67 Becker, Loftus E, Jr. ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others’, 
22 Connecticut Law Review (1989–1990), 203–238; and Gilbert, ‘Computer Bulletin Board Operator 
Liability’, supra note 27, at 439–454. 
68 Gilbert, ‘Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability’, supra note 27, at 441. 
69 See Becker, ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators’, supra note 67, at 215. 
70 See among other authorities Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1949), 4 January 1949; 
Church of Scientology v. Minnesota Medical Association, 264 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 1978), 17 March 1978. See 
also Becker, ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators’, supra note 67, at 215 and 226. 
71 See Becker, ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators’, supra note 67, at 215. 
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the supplier knows or has reason to know that the equipment will be used to disseminate 
wrongful content.72 A classic example of this group is a telephone company relaying calls.73  
2.2.2.2 Bulletin board operators 
Liabilities of bulletin board operators 
With regard to the Internet, the first US commentators used the so-called Internet ‘bulletin 
boards’ as an example when discussing issues of liability. ‘Bulletin boards’ were the 
precursors to the mainstream use of the World Wide Web by ISPs. They were usually small-
scale, locally oriented systems that allowed the storage of information submitted by users 
and the retransmitting of that information to other users. The early commentators considered 
that the ‘bulletin board’ operators’ potential and often actual control over the information 
published might justify the drawing of parallels between them and the representatives of the 
classical press. As mentioned above, traditionally the latter had been held liable for all the 
material published, even when the actual words had been written by a third party.74 
Associating ‘bulletin board’ operators with the classical press would thus have implied that 
they also should have been held liable for infringing content authored by their users. Thus, 
to follow the terminology used in this research, they would have been regarded as ‘content 
providers’. However, the US legal commentators argued that this was not the right analogy 
to follow because it ignored the key element of the US printed media cases.  
According to Loftus Becker, the aforementioned key element is that ‘everything that goes 
into a book, newspaper, or magazine is “known” to some agent of the publisher, who is thus 
vicariously chargeable with that knowledge’. Accordingly, from these cases it follows that 
the emphasis should always be on the ‘actual knowledge’ and not on the nature of the entity. 
A publisher should not be held liable for publishing something regardless of whether he or 
she was aware of the publication. Thus, imposing liability on the publisher requires that the 
publisher has had an opportunity to remove the offending material.75 Becker argues that this 
interpretation is expressly established in the case of Smith v. California, where the Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance imposing ‘strict liability’ for booksellers found in 
possession of obscene material.76 According to Becker, it follows from the continued 
                                                 
72 Ibid, at 219. 
73 Ibid, at 215. 
74 Becker, ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators’, supra note 67, at 222. 
75 Ibid, at 222–223. 
76 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), 14 December 1959. Becker notes that although the Supreme Court 
had not expanded the application of this ruling since, it had regularly cited it in both obscenity and libel cases. 
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viability of Smith that ‘the old asserted strict-liability rule for publishers of printed material 
cannot be applied either to them or to computer bulletin board operators consistent with the 
first amendment’.77 Therefore, computer ‘bulletin board’ operators should be treated as 
‘secondary publishers’ or, using the terminology adopted in this research, ‘host providers’ 
and thus liable only if they continued to make the information available after becoming 
aware of the wrongful material being transmitted.78 The form of liability discussed by the 
US commentators was mainly civil liability. However, the possibility of imposing criminal 
liability was also noted. For example, Gilbert suggested that such liability should be imposed 
only when the ‘bulletin board’ operators’ actions demonstrated that they were intentionally 
furthering or promoting criminal activity by knowingly ignoring its existence.79 
Duties of bulletin board operators 
Regardless of the adaption of an approach restricting the liability of ‘bulletin board’ 
operators, the early US commentators also suggested methods for tackling issues related to 
anonymous commenting. One of these methods was the imposition of duties on these same 
operators. The idea was that by acting in accordance with these duties, the website operators 
could escape liability for misuse by others. At the same time it was stressed, however, that 
the operators should not be imposed a burden creating a ‘chilling effect’, which would 
discourage them from running their services altogether.80 This would have undermined the 
benefits created by the Internet to the exercise of freedom of speech.  
One of the suggested measures entailed the use of a mechanism for identifying the 
individuals posting messages by, for example, requiring the users to create an account before 
allowing them to generate content. Some commentators, such as Gilbert, went even further 
by requiring that, in order to avoid liability, the operators should also try to verify the given 
identity of the commentators. Another measure proposed was the pre-screening of content. 
This measure, however, was subject to criticism even by those who suggested it. Arguably, 
even though this measure might offer ‘the most potential deterrent value’, the benefit is 
gained at too great a cost. The presumed risks entailed the commercial operators raising their 
costs to meet the additional burden created by the pre-screening and, worse, the non-profit 
                                                 
See among other authorities Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), 24 June 1974; and Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), 26 June 1985. 
77 Becker, ‘The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators’, supra note 67, at 235. 
78 Ibid, at 223, 228 and 235. 
79 Gilbert, ‘Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability’, supra note 27, at 453–454. 
80 Ibid, at 442. 
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service operators stopping to offer their facilities altogether. In addition, it was feared that 
the operators might start to censor completely legitimate messages in order to avoid all 
liability. This would endanger the very core principals of the US free speech doctrine.81 The 
third measure proposed was the application of automatic screening systems. This measure 
entails the programming of the services to automatically reject any material containing 
certain terms. However, also this measure was seen to entail a risk of deletion of completely 
legitimate material simply including words that in other context might form a wrongful 
message.82  
In addition to the aforementioned measures, measures to reduce the damage already caused 
were also discussed. These included, for example, the application of ‘notice-and-takedown 
systems’. The idea was that these systems would allow other users to inform the operator of 
a message allegedly including wrongful content. After receiving this information the 
operator should then review said content and decide whether it ought to be deleted. Another 
similar method suggested was the deletion of messages after a specific period of time. In 
connection to this measure it was noted, however, that its advantages would probably be 
outweighed by its undesirable implications: the automatic deletion of all content after certain 
period of time would also destroy a lot of desirable content impairing the Internet’s usability 
as an information tool.83  
This discourse by the US commentators has later acted as a universal source of inspiration 
and many of the suggested measures are used today by different online operators. However, 
the debate regarding their benefits and disadvantages carries on. Moreover, different 
approaches exist as to whether the authorities may oblige ‘bulletin board’ operators – or later 
ISPs – to apply these measures. I will return to this question in the course of this research. 
2.2.2.3 Emergence of case-law 
The very first case regarding online liability was the 1991 defamation case Cubby Inc. v. 
CompuServe, where the State District Court decided that the ‘bulletin board’ operator 
(CompuServe) could not be held liable for user-generated content that it was not aware of.84 
                                                 
81 Ibid, at 445–447. 
82 Ibid, at 449. 
83 Ibid, at 451–452.  
84 Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe 776 F. Supreme Court 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), 29 October 1991. A person sued 
CompuServe after an anonymous user had posted defamatory material about the plaintiff’s business to a 
discussion forum operated by CompuServe. The District Court ruled in benefit of CompuServe. It should be 
noted that, unlike the other cases, this case was ruled by US State courts. In the United States there are two 
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This decision was well-received among the ‘bulletin board’ operators, but their joy did not 
last for long. The State Supreme Court soon took an opposing view in the case of Stratton 
Oakmont v. Prodigy.85 In this case, the applicant had filed a libel action after an anonymous 
user posted defamatory messages on a ‘bulletin board’ hosted by Prodigy. In its judgment 
the court specifically states that there is a twofold distinction to be made between 
CompuServe and Prodigy. Firstly, Prodigy had held itself out to the public as a network that 
had ‘editorial control’ over the content on its ‘bulletin board’. Secondly, Prodigy had 
implemented this control through an automatic software screening program, which identified 
offensive language, and ‘user guidelines’ that the board operators were required to enforce. 
The court concluded that by this active utilization of technology and man power to delete 
wrongful messages, Prodigy had in fact gained ‘editorial control’ of the published content.86 
Accordingly, Prodigy was to be considered a publisher – or a ‘content provider’ – rather than 
a distributor.87 This ruling was met with fear of ‘chilling effect’. Legal commentators were 
afraid that due to this ruling the ‘bulletin board’ operators would rather not allow publication 
of any controversial material than to risk of being held liable for it.88 
Even the legislator reacted to the judgment in Prodigy. It inspired the United States’ 
Congress to enact the aforementioned Communications Decency Act.89 Provision of interest 
in this context is Section 230 CDA, which states that ‘no provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider...’90 The impact of this Section was first witnessed in 
the case of Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (AOL), where the Circuit Court concluded that 
(under Section 230 CDA) it is prohibited to impose computer service providers liability for 
user-generated content regardless of whether they are to be considered as publishers 
                                                 
separate court systems: the State courts and the Federal courts. Usually, the cases concerning the US 
Constitution are ruled by the Federal courts. The Federal Supreme Court is the highest court in Constitutional 
issues and it has the final say over which rights are protected by the Constitution and when they are violated. 
See more on the United States of America, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, ‘Why Two Court 
Systems?’, website of the United Sates Courts, <http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-
informed/federal-court-basics.aspx>, 12 January 2015. 
85 Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Suat Ct. 1995), 24 May 1995.  
86 Court referred to the case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), 25 June 1974. 
87 See also Mullooly, Paula, ‘Liability for Defamatory Statements on The Internet: A Comparative Overview’, 
1 Hibernian Law Journal (2000), 202–225, at 204–205. 
88 The principal concern regarded the possible ‘chilling effect’ for the ISPs. See Steele, Shari, ‘Taking a Byte 
Out of the First Amendment – How Free is Speech in Cyberspace’, 23 Human Rights 1 (1996), 14–16, at 14. 
89 Communications Decency Act, supra note 57. 
90 Cited in Mullooly, ‘Liability for Defamatory Statements’, supra note 87, at 205. 
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(‘content providers’) or distributors (‘hosts’). 91 The court came to this conclusion after 
deciding that the purpose of Section 230 CDA is to minimize the amount of Government 
regulation and to encourage service providers to self-regulate.92 Moreover, the court stressed 
that while it would be impossible for the service providers to screen the vast amount of 
information transmitted via their services, applying tort liability to them would have an 
obvious ‘chilling effect’.93 In addition, the Supreme Court rejected the use of ‘notice-and-
takedown systems’. It stated that these systems only create ‘a natural incentive simply to 
remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not’. 
Furthermore, since any efforts to screen the posted material would probably lead to more 
notifications thereby creating a stronger basis for liability, the service providers might just 
‘eschew any attempts at self-regulation’. The Supreme Court refused Zeran’s appeal without 
a comment, much to the delight of service providers.  
Accordingly, the opinion given in the case of Zeran established an extensive freedom of 
liability for all online operators. Hence, even if user-generated online speech falls under the 
afore-described exemptions from the protection of First Amendment, the online operator 
facilitating its distribution cannot be held responsible for it. It will be interesting to see 
whether this same approach has been adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe.  
                                                 
91 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), 12 November 1997. Zeran had sued AOL 
alleging that it had acted negligently in allowing a prankster to post wrongful messages with Zeran’s phone 
number on them, and by not responding quickly enough to Zeran’s requests to stop the postings. 
92 See on this Mullooly, ‘Liability for Defamatory Statements’, supra note 87, at 206. 
93 The court stated the following: ‘It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions 
of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services, 
interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages 
posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize service 
providers to avoid any such restrictive effect…’ 
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PART I: COUNCIL OF EUROPE BEFORE INTERNET 
 Defining Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech 
 Definition of Freedom of Expression 
1.1.1 Article 10 
Article 10 of the European Human Rights Convention stands as follows: 
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.’ 
Thus, Article 10(1) establishes the right to freedom of expression as ‘a compound right’, 
which entails three main elements: (i) ‘the right to hold opinions’, (ii) ‘the right to receive 
information and ideas’, and (iii) ‘the right to impart information and ideas’.94 Furthermore, 
as a matter of principle, Article 10 protects all kinds of expressions notwithstanding their 
content or who has disseminated them: an individual, a group, or any type of media.95 Article 
10(2), however, lists the specific criteria based on which the aforementioned rights can be 
restricted. These criteria require that every restriction must be ‘described by law’ and 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ in order to pursue at least one of the specific aims listed 
                                                 
94 McGonagle, Tarlach, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis of Council of Europe Strategies for Countering ‘Hate 
Speech’ in Herz, Michael and Molnar, Peter (eds.), The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking 
Regulation and Responses (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 456–498, at 459. 
95 Macovei, Monica, Freedom of Expression: a Guide to the Implementation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Handbooks No. 2, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004), at 7. 
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in the paragraph. In addition, in its praxis the ECtHR has highlighted that all restrictions 
imposed on freedom of expression must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.96 
The drafting work of Article 10 was heavily influenced by that of Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1966.97 During the drafting of these Articles, different opinions existed 
regarding whether the respective provisions should specifically state that the right to freedom 
of expression is not absolute but ‘carries with it duties and responsibilities’.98 The winning 
proposals stated the following: 
‘In the view of the powerful influence the modern media and the expression 
exerted upon the minds of men and upon national and international affairs, the 
“duties and responsibilities” in the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression should be specifically emphasized.’99  
Accordingly, the notion of ‘duties and responsibilities’ was added to the final formulations 
of both provisions.100 A similar debate existed regarding the listing of specific aims 
justifying the restrictions. In this debate, the drafters of the two Articles settled on differing 
approaches. Accordingly, the key difference between said Articles is that, unlike Article 19 
ICCPR, Article 10(2) ECHR entails a list of legitimate aims which might justify a restriction 
of freedom of expression provided that this restriction is also ‘prescribed by law’ and 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. The rationale behind this approach was best expressed 
by the minority in the drafting of Article 19 ICCPR, as quoted in the preparatory works of 
Article 10 ECHR: 
                                                 
96 See among other authorities Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, 
§ 49. 
97 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7. 
98 See European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 17 August 1956, DH (56)15, § 22.  
99 Ibid, § 127. 
100 However, in the case of Article 19(3) ICCPR word ‘special’ was added before it as a compromise. ICCPR, 
Article 19 stands a follows: (1) ‘Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. (3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of 
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations 
of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.’  
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‘It is susceptible of arbitrary interpretation and application; that if the 
Covenant was to be a satisfactory legal instrument permissible restrictions on 
freedom of expression should be set forth in precise unequivocal language, and 
that a wider degree of freedom of expression would be ensured where 
limitations were enumerated carefully and in detail.’101  
1.1.2  Prohibition of abuse of rights 
Under the law of the Convention, in addition to the criteria listed in Article 10(2) ECHR, 
freedom of expression can be restricted on the basis of ‘prohibition of abuse of rights’ under 
Article 17 ECHR, which reads as follows: 
‘Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.’ 
Article 17 was included to prevent the abuse of the Convention by those whose intentions 
are ‘contrary to the letter and spirit’ of it and those who wish to ‘attack the fundamental 
values of the treaty or European democracy’.102 However, few explanations of this provision 
were provided before its adoption.103 Statements made in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (hereinafter ‘the Parliamentary Assembly’ or ‘the Assembly’) referred to 
experiences of Nazism, fascism and communism, and called for ‘a vehicle in order to 
construct a democratic community able to defend itself’.104 Essentially, Article 17 ECHR 
applies to those Convention rights that could be exploited as a right to engage in activities 
that abuse the rights or freedoms recognized in the Convention.105 Freedom of expression 
has been recognized as such a right. 
                                                 
101 See European Commission of Human Rights Preparatory Work on Article 10, supra note 98, § 130. 
102 Keller, Perry, European and International Media Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 390; and 
McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, supra note 94, at 459. 
103 Van Drooghenbroeck, Sébastien, ‘L’Article 17 de la Convention Européenne des Droits De l’Homme Est-
Il Indispensable ?’, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2001), 541–566, at 542–543. 
104 Cannie, Hannes and Voorhoof, Dirk, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European 
Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection?’, 29 Netherland 
Quarterly of Human Rights 1 (2011), 54–83, at 56.  
105 Weber, Anne, Manual on Hate Speech, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2009), at 22. 
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 Freedom of Expression in Practice 
1.2.1 Classic case of Handyside  
In a long series of judgments the Court has emphasized the significance of freedom of 
expression in a democratic society, where it ‘constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
individual’.106 Furthermore, the Court has stressed that freedom of expression ‘goes hand in 
hand with exceptions calling for a strict interpretation, and the need to restrict this right must 
be determined in a convincing manner’.107 The Court first established this and other 
significant principles regarding the application of Article 10 ECHR in 1976, in the classic 
case of Handyside v. the United Kingdom.108 This case concerned the publication of a Danish 
schoolbook in the United Kingdom. The book aimed to, among other things, provide sex 
education for pupils aged 12 and upwards.109 The British authorities deemed the content of 
the book obscene, issued a fine, and confiscated the publication. The applicant’s complaints 
regarding violations of his Article 10 right were later analysed by the Court.110  
Since Handyside, the Court always begins its analysis of claimed infringements of Article 
10 by assessing whether the interference with freedom of expression has been ‘prescribed 
by law’. In the case of Handyside, this criterion was not discussed in too much detail.111 
However, in subsequent case-law, the Court has interpreted this criterion as requiring that 
the law in question is foreseeable in a way that a ‘person is able to regulate his or her conduct 
and foresee, if need be with appropriate advice and to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which the given actions may entail’.112 The notion of 
predictability is ‘to a great extent dependent on the contents of the text in question, of its 
scope and the number and position of the persons to whom it is addressed’.113 Next, the 
                                                 
106 See Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 49; Lingens v. Austria, Application no. 9815/82, 8 
July 1986, § 41; Jersild v. Denmark, Application no. 15890/89, [GC] 23 September 1994, § 31; and Murat 
Vural v. Turkey, Application no. 9540/07, 21 October 2014, § 61.  
107 Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 30. 
108 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96. See analysis of the case in Mowbray, Alastair, Cases, 
Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2012), at 627–632. 
109 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 11. 
110 Ibid, § 39. 
111 Ibid, § 44. 
112 See among other authorities the cases of Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), Application no. 
6538/74, 26 April 1979, § 49; Müller and Others v. Switzerland, Application no. 10737/84, 24 May 1988, § 
29; Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 17488/90, [GC] 27 March 1996, § 31; and Lahtonen v. 
Finland, Application no. 29576/09, 17 January 2012, § 57. 
113 Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 31. 
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Court analyses the necessity of the interference. In the case of Handyside, the Court adopted, 
for the first time, the view that the notion of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ corresponds 
to the existence of ‘a pressing social need’.114 Moreover, interference with the protected right 
must not be greater than is necessary to address this need. This requirement is referred to as 
the ‘principle of proportionality’.115 Furthermore, the Court has established that when 
analysing the existence of ‘pressing social need’, it must give due regard to the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ afforded to the domestic authorities by Article 10(2).116 The idea behind the 
notion of ‘margin of appreciation’ is that domestic authorities are ‘in a better position than 
the international judge’ to analyse the situation of their respective country, and to decide on 
whether it is necessary to impose a ‘restriction’ or a ‘penalty’ for certain acts. Accordingly, 
the Court is not to take the place of the competent domestic courts but to review under Article 
10 the decisions made in the exercise of their power of appreciation.117 When conducting its 
review the Court takes into account the specific circumstances of the case ‘in the light of the 
case as a whole’. This way, the domestic ‘margin of appreciation’ goes ‘hand in hand with 
a European supervision’.118 It is, however, always up to the Court to decide whether the 
justifications given by the domestic authorities for the interference are ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ from the perspective of Article 10(2) ECHR.119 
Another significant principle the Court first adopted in Handyside is that, subject to Article 
10(2), freedom of expression covers not only ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are ‘favourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference’ but also those that ‘offend, 
shock or disturb’.120 In its later praxis, the Court has further developed this idea and stressed 
                                                 
114 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 48. For subsequent case-law see, among other 
authorities, Lingens v. Austria, supra note 106, § 39; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, Application no. 24662/94, 
[GC] 23 September 1998, § 51; and Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, [GC] 
13 July 2012, § 48. 
115 See Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 325. See the case of Silver v. 
the United Kingdom, Application nos 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 706175, 7113/75 and 7136/75, 25 March 
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116 See on ‘margin of appreciation’ Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary, supra note 108, at 633–644. 
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Court found it impossible ‘to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a uniform European 
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speech’ cases. See among other authorities Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, Application nos 
21279/02 and 36448/02, [GC] 22 October 2007. 
118 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, §§ 48–49. For subsequent case-law see, among other 
authorities, Lingens v. Austria, supra note 106, §§ 39–40; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, supra note 114, § 
51; and Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, [GC] 13 July 2012, § 48. 
119 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 50. See also Hirvelä & Heikkilä, Ihmisoikeudet, supra 
note 18, at 511–512. For more detailed analysis see Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, 
supra note 3, at 325–332. 
120 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, supra note 96, § 49. For subsequent case-law see, among other 
authorities, Lingens v. Austria, supra note 106, § 41; Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey, Application nos 25067/94 
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the significance of taking into account the individual and minority viewpoints to avoid the 
risk of public debate turning into ‘the preserve of majoritarian, mainstream and orthodox 
opinion’.121 In Handyside, the Court concludes its analysis by deciding that there had been 
no breach of Article 10 because the restrictions fell within the scope of the criteria 
established in Article 10(2) ECHR.122 Nevertheless, the aforementioned principles continue 
to form the starting point for the Court’s analysis of cases alleging a violation of freedom of 
expression.  
1.2.2 Special protection afforded to media 
Although Article 10 does not specifically refer to any group, special protection is afforded 
to the press and media professionals in the Court’s case-law. The Court has stated the 
following:  
‘These principles are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned. 
Whilst it must not overstep the bounds set… it is nevertheless incumbent on it 
to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. Not only does 
the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public 
also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable 
to play its vital role of “public watchdog”.’123  
This special protection covers several different aspects of journalistic activities such as the 
freedom to report on matters of public interest, as well as presentational and editorial 
freedom.124 The Court has also noted that this protection has implications for the domestic 
authorities’ ‘margin of appreciation’, which is restricted when the author of the expression 
concerned is a journalist ‘fulfilling his social duty’.125 However, to counterbalance the 
special protection, the Court has also stressed the responsibilities of media professionals. 
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60641/08, [GC] 7 February 2012, § 101. 
121 See on this McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, supra note 94, at 460. See from the Court’s case-
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These responsibilities follow from the Court’s recognition that, in the hands of the mass 
media, free expression is a powerful tool, which can be used also to incite violence and 
spread hatred.126 Accordingly, the Court has stated that journalists’ right to impart 
information on matters of public interest is protected provided that they act in good faith, on 
an accurate factual basis, and provide ‘reliable and precise’ information in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism.127 In other words, from the enjoyment of special protection follows 
‘the expectation of adherence to professional ethics and codes of conduct’.128 With this 
regard, the Court has stated the following: 
‘In a world in which the individual is confronted with vast quantities of 
information circulated via traditional and electronic media and involving an 
ever-growing number of players, monitoring compliance with journalistic 
ethics takes on added importance.’129 
It should be noted, however, that the Court has not been entirely unanimous in this tendency 
to stress journalistic responsibilities.130 Criticism from inside the Court is reflected in a 
number of dissenting opinions.131 Also academic commentators have expressed their 
disapproval towards shifting the balance away from the freedom of the press towards its 
responsibilities.132 According to them, it is not for the Court to combine legal and ethical 
issues in this way. They are afraid that it might result in ‘journalistic practices assuming 
greater importance than the public’s right to receive information and the media’s right to 
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impart it’.133 Moreover, Tarlach McGonagle has pointed out that an undue emphasis on 
journalists’ responsibilities can create a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.134 This 
criticism should be kept in mind when discussing the imposition of liabilities on the media 
and, therefore, during the course of this research. 
 Definition of Hate Speech  
Defining ‘hate speech’ is by no means a simple task since no universally accepted definition 
of this term exists. The term was first used by the Council of Europe in 1997, when the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (hereinafter ‘the Committee of Ministers’ 
or ‘the Committee’) adopted its Recommendation on ‘hate speech’.135 According to this 
Recommendation, ‘hate speech’ encompasses the following: 
‘[A]ll forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial 
hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, or other forms of hatred based on 
intolerance, including intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and 
ethnocentrism, discrimination, and hostility towards minorities, migrants, and 
people of immigrant origin.’136 
Although the Court has referred to this definition, the references have been neither frequent 
nor comprehensive enough to make this definition the Court’s binding interpretation of the 
term.137 As a result, Member States are not legally bound by this definition and it mainly 
acts as a helpful guideline.138  
Although reluctant to rely purely on the definition provided by the Committee, the Court has 
also refrained from trying to define ’hate speech’ itself. As with many other notions, the 
Court prefers to analyse each case on its own merits and avoid being constrained by 
definitions that could limit its actions in the future.139 The Court has, however, continuously 
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stressed that ‘it is particularly conscious of the vital importance of combating racial 
discrimination in all its forms and manifestations’.140 Moreover, the Court has emphasized 
in various judgments that ‘tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all human beings 
constitute the foundations of a democratic, pluralistic society’. From these findings, the 
Court has derived the following rule: 
‘As a matter of principle it may be considered necessary in certain democratic 
societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread, 
incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance, provided that any 
“formalities”, “conditions”, “restrictions” or “penalties” imposed are 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.’141  
Moreover, the Court has not abstained from using the term ‘hate speech’. It first appeared in 
the Court’s argumentation in four judgments given against Turkey in 1999.142 The case of 
Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) concerned the publication of two readers’ letters in a Turkish news 
review and the subsequent conviction of the owner of said review for disseminating 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State. In its judgment, the Court first reiterates 
the principle adopted in the aforementioned Handyside case according to which ‘the mere 
fact that “information” or “ideas” offend, shock, or disturb does not suffice to justify’ an 
interference.143 The Court then continues by stating that ‘what is in issue in the instant case, 
however, is “hate speech” and the glorification of violence’.144 Thus, instead of finding a 
violation of Article 10 ECHR, the Court established a new category of expressions that do 
not fall under the scope of protection offered by the principles set forth in Handyside. ‘Hate 
speech’ is something qualitatively different from speech that just offends, shocks or 
disturbs.145  
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Following the judgment in Sürek, the term ‘hate speech’ has continued to appear in the 
Court’s case-law, and in a number of other documents drafted by the Council of Europe.146 
However, it can be argued that since there is neither legally binding nor otherwise 
authoritative definition of the term, it is susceptible to both over and under exclusive 
interpretations.147 For example, McGonagle has stressed that, especially from the 
perspective of legal certainty and foreseeability, the Court should provide a clear sense of 
what ‘hate speech’ entails. In McGonagle’s view, the Court’s use of the term has been neither 
systematic nor consistent. He notes, for example, that sometimes the term does not appear 
in the Court’s argumentation at all, although the type of expression in question seems to fall 
in the scope of classic ‘hate speech’ examples.148 This was the situation, inter alia, in the 
case of Norwood v. the United Kingdom, which concerned the conviction of a far-right party 
politician for displaying a poster in his window presenting the Twin Towers in flames with 
the text ‘Islam out of Britain – Protect the British People’ and a symbol of crescent and star 
in prohibition signs. In its judgment, the Court refrains from use of the term, but states the 
following:  
‘Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group 
as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values 
proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace 
and non-discrimination.’149 
Thus, it seems that the Council has failed to adopt a clear definition of ‘hate speech’. A more 
detailed analysis of the rules and principles adopted by the Council bodies, and especially 
the Court, is required to form an understanding of what constitutes ‘hate speech’.  
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 Adopted Strategies: hate speech and media liability 
Despite the lack of clear definition, the Council of Europe has adopted a number of strategies 
in an attempt to counter ‘hate speech’. These strategies are being put into operation via 
different means including treaty-based approaches; monitoring systems; political and policy 
making measures; and educational, informational and cultural initiatives.150 Moreover, from 
early on, the Council’s work against incitement to hatred has highlighted the important role 
of the media. As Perry Keller has expressed, ‘the media has been identified not only as the 
primary vehicle responsible for the spread of ethnic hatred but also as the most important 
positive influence in fostering greater tolerance’.151  
 Treaty-Based Strategies 
The media’s potential role in inciting hatred was first brought forward at a treaty-based level 
in the 1989 Convention on Transfrontier Television, which requires State Parties to ensure 
that television programmes provided by broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not contain 
any forms of incitement to racial hatred.152 To date, however, only 34 States have ratified 
this convention, and its revision was discontinued in 2009 due to claims made by the EU, 
who has acquired exclusive competence in this field.153 Accordingly, the status of this 
convention remains unclear.154  
Another important convention in this context is the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 
1994.155 The provisions of particular relevance here are (i) Article 6 regarding the 
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encouragement of a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue, and (ii) Article 9 regarding 
freedom of expression and access to media.156 According to McGonagle, FCNM’s principal 
strategy for countering ‘hate speech’ is based on the ‘synergistic interaction’ between these 
two Articles. They both endorse pre-emptive measures and seek to address the problem of 
‘hate speech’ before it actually occurs. McGonagle argues that emphasizing ‘the need to 
foster, including via the media, improved interethnic and intercultural understanding and 
tolerance through the development of dialogical relationships between communities’ is key 
to achieving this aim.157 Unfortunately, as the name of the FCNM suggests, the convention 
is only a ‘framework’ and, therefore, allows great leeway to State Parties, which are, inter 
alia, allowed to implement the programmatic provisions of the convention in a way that 
reflects the circumstances prevailing in their country. This has undoubtedly reduced the 
impact of the FCNM. However, the implementation of the provisions is assessed through a 
system of State-monitoring conducted by the so-called Advisory Committee, which has 
brought added value to the convention by taking an active approach towards its task.158 In 
its opinions to the country reports submitted by the State Parties, the Advisory Committee 
has recognized, inter alia, the important role media plays in the transmission and 
legitimization of minority cultures.159 Furthermore, the Committee has constantly stressed 
the significance of special training for journalists on minority issues.160 
 Standard-Setting Texts 
Due to the lack of legally binding documents tackling issues of ‘hate speech’, many standard-
setting texts have been adopted in the auspices of the Council with this regard. Although not 
legally binding, these ‘soft law’ instruments should not be overlooked. They carry out the 
important task of indicating ‘the normative status quo in relation to their subject matter’ or 
the direction in which the body that adopted them would wish ‘future law and policy to 
develop’.161 At its best, application of these instruments might help to overcome a ‘deadlock 
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in relations between States’ pursuing conflicting interests or ideologies. They might, for 
example, form the first step in reaching an international consensus on the formulation or 
outright adaption of new human rights provisions.162 Although initially adopted as a 
standard-setting instrument, this type of document may later turn into a binding custom or 
become the basis of a treaty.163  
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
In 1993, the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe adopted a Declaration 
on Combating Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism and Intolerance later often referred to 
as the Vienna Declaration.164 In this Declaration, Member States express their disapproval 
towards the reappearance of racism in Europe, and urge co-operation in suppressing such 
racist activities. One of the collective initiatives adopted to achieve this goal foresees the 
establishment of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). Today, 
ECRI operates as the Council’s monitoring body on the effort to suppress the evils listed in 
the title of the Vienna Declaration.165 With its fourteen existing General Policy 
Recommendations (GPRs), ECRI has dealt with several ‘hate speech’ related issues.166 The 
first GPR was adopted in 1996 and it calls Member States to ensure, first of all, that their 
domestic laws ‘expressly and specifically’ combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and 
intolerance. ECRI has also highlighted the importance of active and constant use of ‘criminal 
prosecution of offences of a racist or xenophobic nature’, as well as that of organizing 
training courses for public officials ‘promoting cultural sensitivity, awareness of prejudice 
and knowledge of legal aspects of discrimination’.167 Moreover, in GPR No. 2 adopted in 
1997, ECRI stresses the establishment of independent specialized bodies, such as national 
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commissions, ombudsmen, or specialized Centres, to carry out the combat recognized in 
GPR No. 1.168  
Along with adopting GPRs, ECRI carries out country-by-country monitoring of all the 
Member States of the Council. No sanctions follow from a State’s failure to implement 
ECRI’s recommendations, but the monitoring results are public, which can create political 
pressure. In the context of this research, it is interesting to note that in its recommendations 
ECRI has repetitively urged domestic authorities to adopt ‘particular vigilance’ in 
identifying and prosecuting cases of incitement to or dissemination of hatred by media 
professionals.169 In addition to stressing the importance of proper legislation and its 
enforcement, ECRI has also emphasized the importance of self-regulatory codes adopted by 
the media sector.170 
Committee of Ministers 
Perhaps the most active of the Council’s non-specialized bodies in tackling ‘hate speech’ 
has been the Committee of Ministers. It is the Council’s decision-making body comprising 
of Foreign Affairs Ministers or permanent diplomatic representatives of all the Member 
States.171 It became involved in the issue of media impact on incitement to racial and other 
forms of hatred when it adopted the two complementary recommendations dealing with the 
issue in 1997.  
First of the two was the aforementioned Recommendation No. R (97) on ‘hate speech’, 
which deals with the potential negative role of the media in the propagation of ‘hate 
speech’.172 As mentioned above, it has later become one of the key points of reference for 
                                                 
168 General Policy Recommendation No. 2 on Specialised Bodies to Combat Racism, Xenophobia, 
Antisemitism and Intolerance at National Level, 13 June 1997, CRI(97)36. 
169 See, inter alia, ECRI Report on the Czech Republic (Third monitoring cycle): adopted on 5 December 2003, 
8 June 2004, CRI(2004)22, § 65; and ECRI Report on Sweden (Third monitoring cycle): adopted on 17 
December 2004, 14 June 2005, CRI(2005)26, § 9. See also McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, 
supra note 94, at 489. On the other hand, ECRI has also encouraged the prosecution and punishment of the 
authors or publishers of racist articles. See on this ECRI Report on Estonia (Third monitoring cycle): adopted 
on 24 June 2005, 21 February 2006, CRI(2006)1, § 115; and ECRI Report on Bulgaria (Fifth monitoring cycle): 
adopted on 19 June 2014, 16 September 2014, CRI(2014)36, § 35. 
170 Calling for the adoption of such a code see, inter alia, ECRI Report on Austria (Third monitoring cycle): 
adopted on 25 June 2004, 15 February 2005, CRI(2005)1, § 73; and Czech Republic, supra note 169, § 65. 
And calling for the implementation of such a code see, inter alia, for ECRI Report on Norway (Third monitoring 
cycle): adopted on 27 June 2003, 27 January 2004, CRI(2004)3, § 80; and ECRI Report on ‘the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (Third monitoring cycle): adopted on 25 June 2004, 15 February 2005, 
CRI(2005)4, § 94. See also McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, supra note 94, at 489. 
171See Committee of Ministers, ‘About the Committee of Ministers’,  
<http://www.coe.int/T/CM/aboutCM_en.asp>, 3 January 2015.  
172 Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on ‘hate speech’, supra note 135. 
35 
 
the Court and the Council of Europe in general with regard to ‘hate speech’.173 The principles 
annexed to the Recommendation encourage Member States to ‘establish or maintain a sound 
legal framework consisting of civil, criminal and administrative law provisions on hate 
speech’ enabling authorities to reconcile each case by taking into consideration the different 
interests at stake.174 However, at the same time Member States should remember that any 
interference with the freedom of expression must be ‘narrowly circumscribed and applied in 
a lawful and non-arbitrary manner on the basis of objective criteria’.175 Moreover, Member 
States are reminded that a distinction must be made between ‘the responsibility of the author 
of expressions of “hate speech” on one hand, and any responsibility of the media and media 
professionals contributing to their dissemination as part of their mission to communicate 
information and ideas on matters of public interest on the other hand’.176 In other words, 
Article 10 protects the act of reporting ‘hate speech’ and thus any restriction to this right 
must meet the criteria set forth in Article 10(2). In addition, when deciding on any 
restrictions, domestic authorities must take due regard of the consideration afforded in the 
Court’s case-law to ‘the manner, contents, context and purpose of the reporting’.177 
The second recommendation, adopted by the Committee in 1997, was the Recommendation 
No. R (97) 21 on the media and the promotion of a culture of tolerance, which concentrates 
on the positive role of the media in combating ‘hate speech’.178 It urges the Member States 
to promote the training of media professionals to counter intolerance.179 Moreover, it 
emphasizes the importance of encouraging journalists to make a positive contribution 
towards the development of tolerance and mutual understanding between the different 
groups of society.180 According to the Recommendation, such aims could be implemented, 
for example, in the ‘codes of conduct’ drafted by different sectors of the media.181 
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Parliamentary Assembly 
The Parliamentary Assembly has also shown considerable activity regarding media and ‘hate 
speech’ issues. The Assembly is a political body comprised of 318 members from the 
parliaments of the Member States. It gathers four times a year to discuss topical issues.182 
As early as 1970, it adopted a Recommendation on mass communication media and human 
rights, where Member States are called to encourage media organizations to ‘draw up a 
professional code of ethics for journalists’.183 Later, in 1993, the Assembly adopted its own 
Resolution on the ethics of journalism stressing the importance of setting up self-regulatory 
bodies by the media.184 Moreover, similarly to the Committee of Ministers, the Assembly 
has noted the significant influence media portrayal of immigrants and ethnic minorities has 
on public opinion. It has asked Member States to encourage both public and private media 
‘to play a responsible role in combating racism and xenophobia through objective coverage 
of migrant and ethnic minority issues’.185 In addition, the Assembly has adopted a 
considerable body of texts focusing especially on the complex issues arising from the 
relationship between freedom of expression, freedom of religion and ‘hate speech’.186 
Nonetheless, the Assembly’s work has concentrated on the effective enforcement of national 
legislations prohibiting ‘hate speech’.187 It has, for example, recommended the 
criminalization of publication, production, or storage of ‘material with a racist content or 
purpose’; and dissemination ‘anti-Semitic and other hate speech, in particular incitement to 
violence’.188 However, simultaneously the Assembly has stressed that ‘only incitement to 
violence, hate speech and promotion of negationism’ should be punishable by imprisonment, 
making a clear distinction between these offences and, for example, the act of defamation.189 
Furthermore, the Assembly has emphasized that laws criminalizing ‘hate speech’ have to 
respect the right to freedom of expression, and any penalties imposed must be necessary and 
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proportionate.190 However, in spite of these attempts to carefully restrict the applicability of 
the required penal laws, the Assembly’s calls to criminalize ‘hate speech’ have caused 
concern. For example, McGonagle has argued that ‘in the absence of a clear and authoritative 
legal definition’ of ‘hate speech’, ‘the Member States are likely to determine its scope as 
they see fit inducing the risk of appointment of prison sentences for ‘lesser’ forms of 
impugned conduct’.191  
Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy 
The European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy has been held with regularity 
since 1985. It entails the participation of the relevant Ministers or their delegates, and aims 
to ‘map out future European media policy, supplemented by action plans for its 
implementation’.192 Of special interest here is the 4th Ministerial Conference on ‘The Media 
in a Democratic Society’ held in 1994. In the Conference Declaration, the Ministers 
condemn ‘in line with the Vienna Declaration, all forms of expression which incite to racial 
hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and all forms of intolerance, since they undermine 
democratic security, cultural cohesion and pluralism’.193 Moreover, in the Conference 
Action Plan, the Ministers call the Committee of Ministers to investigate, in co-operation 
with media professionals and relevant authorities, the possibility of drafting ‘guidelines 
which could assist media professionals in addressing intolerance in all its forms’.194 Next, I 
will analyse how this and the other aforementioned strategies have been interpreted by the 
Court.  
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 Liability for Hate Speech in Practice 
The cornerstone of all the Council of Europe’s actions is the case-law of the Court, where 
the rules and standards adopted by the other bodies of the Council are interpreted and 
enforced most efficiently. Through a line of judgments the Court has adopted a guiding 
(although not entirely clear) approach towards ‘hate speech’ and related legal questions. I 
will begin my analysis of the Court’s case-law by discussing the application of the 
aforementioned abuse of the rights clause, and its relationship with Article 10. 
 Relationship between Articles 10 and 17 
The Court, and previously the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the 
Commission’), have both relied on Article 17 as well as on the restrictions established in 
Article 10(2) for declaring inadmissible or defeating complaints involving ‘racist, 
xenophobic, or anti-Semitic speech; statements denying, disputing, minimizing, or 
condoning Holocaust; and neo-Nazi idea’.195 Accordingly, when faced with a conflict 
between words inciting to hatred and freedom of expression, the Court has chosen between 
two different approaches: ‘exclusion’ or ‘restriction’ of the right.196 The first approach 
consists of excluding the right to freedom of expression from the protection afforded by 
Article 10 by applying Article 17 ECHR. The second approach entails full analysis of the 
legitimacy of the interference with the right protected by Article 10(1) in the meaning of the 
restriction criteria of Article 10(2), and especially under the ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ test provided for therein.197 The most significant difference between these two 
                                                 
195 The current system entailing a single permanent court replaced the earlier system entailing the combination 
of the Commission and a court, also known as the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the court’), 
when Protocol No. 11 came into force. Before, the Commission was the one to decide on admissibility of the 
applications under Article 35 ECHR. It also established the facts of the cases, conciliated between the parties, 
and drafted non-binding legal opinions as to whether or not there had been a violation. If the case was later 
referred to the court, these legal opinions had a central role in the court’s analysis. See Harris, O’Boyle & 
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention, supra note 3, at 571, 573–575, 652, and 706–708; and Ovey & 
White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 430. The proceedings before the Court still 
entail two phases: deciding on admissibility and the judgment on merits. However, today, both of these phases 
are carried out by the Court. If the application is manifestly inadmissible, it will be dealt with by a single judge 
giving an inadmissibility decision. In other cases, the application is referred to either a Committee of three 
judges or a Chamber of seven judges, which will analyse both the admissibility and, if the application is 
admissible, the merits of the case. See European Court of Human Rights, ‘Life of the application’, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Case_processing_ENG.pdf>, 3 January 2015; and European Court of 
Human Rights, Public Relations Unit, ‘Your Application to the ECHR’ 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Your_Application_ENG.pdf, 3 January 2015, at 6 and 7.  
196 Tulkens, Francoise, ‘When to say is to do – Freedom of expression and ‘hate speech’ in the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Casadevall, Josep; Myjer, Egbert; O’Boyle, Michael; and Austin, Anna 
(eds.), Freedom of Expression: Essays in honour of Nicholas Bratza (Wolf Legal Publishers, Oisterwijk, 2012), 
279–295, at 280.  
197 Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 19. 
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options lies in the conducting of a ‘balancing exercise’. In short, when a case is analysed 
under Article 10 ECHR, the Court recognizes the existence of the right to freedom of 
expression and weighs it against the interests set forth in Article 10(2). Such weighting does 
not take place if the analysis is carried out under Article 17, which allows a type of speech 
to be excluded from protection based solely on its content.198 In its case-law, the Court has 
sought to establish ‘a principal distinction’ between statements inciting to hatred and thus 
categorically excluded from any protection by Article 17, and statements that may be 
restricted outside the scope of protection through analysis carried out under Article 10(2). 
One of the central elements emphasized by the Court in establishing this distinction is the 
context of the impugned statements. An expression is less likely to be interpreted as a 
categorically prohibited form of incitement to violence when it occurs in the context of 
‘reporting to well-informed audience as part of a pluralistic debate’.199 However, the Court 
has not been entirely successful in establishing this distinction, mainly due to the fact that 
Article 17 has been discussed in fewer cases than Article 10.200  
Despite reluctance to directly apply Article 17 ECHR, the Court has also been unwilling to 
disregard it completely. Therefore, in its case-law, the Court has established an ‘indirect 
application’ variant, where Article 17 is applied as a ‘principle of interpretation’ in order to 
assess whether restrictions on freedom of expression are necessary in the meaning of Article 
10(2).201 In practice, the ‘indirect application’ entails the same consideration of the question 
of compliance with Article 10 as the regular analysis carried out under said Article. The 
restriction criteria set forth in Article 10(2) is, however, assessed in the light of Article 17.202 
One of the fundamental questions the Court must ask itself when adopting this ‘principle of 
interpretation’ approach is whether the applicant intended to disseminate racist ideas and 
opinions through the use of ‘hate speech’. If the answer is positive, then the impugned 
statements cannot be tolerated in a democratic society and the interference with right to 
freedom of expression has been necessary. On the contrary, if the applicant – for example, a 
journalist – was only trying to inform the public on matter of public interest without any 
racist intention, then the statements (although they might be perceived as shocking or 
                                                 
198 See Keane, David, ‘Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
25 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 4 (2007), 641–663, at 643 and 661. 
199 Ovey & White, The European Convention, 5th Edition, supra note 3, at 430. 
200 Keller, European and International Media Law, supra note 102, at 391. 
201 Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 27. See, inter alia, the decision of the Commission in 
the case of Kühnen v. Germany, Application no. 12194/86, 28 May 1986. 
202 See among other authorities Lehideux and Isorni v. France, supra note 114, § 38. 
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offensive) are protected by Article 10 ECHR and restrictions cannot be regarded as 
necessary.203 
 Application of Article 17 
3.2.1 Recourse to Article 17 
The use of Article 17 ECHR has varied considerably over time between direct, indirect and 
non-existent application.204 Originally, the Commission rarely applied Article 17 and only 
statements ‘aiming at hypothetical situations of totalitarian doctrine’ were deemed as 
contrary to the Convention and, therefore, excluded from the protection of Article 10.205 As 
mentioned above, the Court has preferred the ‘principle of interpretation’ approach, but has 
not completely abstained from direct application of Article 17 either, occasionally relying 
on it quite heavily.206 It has, for example, affirmed a special status for Holocaust denial and 
revisionist speech by stating that there exists a ‘category of clearly established historical 
facts – such as the Holocaust – whose negation or revision’ is removed from the protection 
of Article 10 by Article 17.207 The Court took perhaps its most clear-cut stance on such 
speech in 2003, in the case of Garaudy v. France.208 This case concerned the conviction of 
a publisher of a book that included chapter titles such as ‘The Myth of the Holocaust’. In its 
argumentation, the Court states that the ‘the denial or rewriting of this type of historical fact 
undermines the values on which the fight against racism and anti-Semitism are based and 
constitutes a serious threat to public order’. After concluding that the general tenor of the 
applicant’s book was ‘markedly revisionist and therefore run counter to the fundamental 
values of the Convention… namely justice and peace’, the Court found the application to 
meet the category of aims prohibited by Article 17 ECHR. Thus, it was declared 
                                                 
203 See Jersild v. Denmark, supra note 106. See also Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 39. 
204 Weber, Manual on Hate Speech, supra note 105, at 23.  
205 See, inter alia, the two inadmissibility decisions: Communist Party (KPD) v. the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Yearbook 1, at 222, decision of 20 July 1957, considering the establishment of ‘the communist social 
order by means of a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat’, and Glimmerveen and 
Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Application nos 8348/78 and 8406/78, decision of 11 October 1979 concerning 
a political party which promoted the idea that ‘the general interest of a State is best served by an ethnical 
homogenous population and not by racial mixing’. 
206 See the first case where the Court applied Article 17 ECHR, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), Application no 
332/57, 1 July 1961, The Law, § 7. On ‘hate speech’ cases, see McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, 
supra note 94, at 459. 
207 See Lehideux and Isorni v. France, supra note 114, § 47. The case concerned an advertisement published 
in the national newspaper Le Monde as part of a campaign aiming to rehabilitate the memory of General 
Philippe Pétain. The advertisement was, at the end, regarded as polemical publication, which are entitled to the 
protection of Article 10 ECHR. 
208 Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65831/01, decision of 24 June 2003. See for an analysis of the case as 
an example of ‘indirect enforcement of non-state actor obligations’ Clapham, Andrew, Human Rights 
Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006), at 409. 
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inadmissible.209 This decision suggests that the special status of Holocaust denial entails the 
direct application of Article 17.210 
In addressing other forms of ‘hate speech’, including racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic 
speech, the Court has mainly relied on the indirect application of Article 17.211 In the case 
of Seurot v. France, the Court only refers to Article 17 before concluding that the racist-
toned publication, written by a teacher and published in a school bulletin, enjoyed protection 
under Article 10. However, in this case restricting this right was necessary in the meaning 
of Article 10(2).212 Thus, it appears that, unlike revisionist speech, other forms of ‘hate 
speech’ in principle enjoy protection under Article 10.213 However, the Court’s position on 
this matter is by no means clear. For example, in its judgment in the case of Jersild v. 
Denmark, the Grand Chamber of the Court states that there is no doubt the racist third-party-
statements ‘were more than insulting to members of the targeted groups’ and did not enjoy 
the protection of Article 10’.214 In this instance, the Court seems willing to extend the direct 
application of Article 17 also to such forms of speech that do not entail Holocaust denial. 
However, in the footnote of the cited sentence, the Court refers to two very different previous 
judgments.215 While the first referred judgment relies on the direct application of Article 17, 
the second adopts an indirect application of the same. It is unclear to which approach the 
majority was referring, although it has been argued that the wiser interpretation would be to 
highlight the reference made to the latter case.216  
Nonetheless, after Jersild the Court has applied Article 17 directly in other cases not 
regarding Holocaust denial. This was done, for example, in the case of Pavel Ivanov v. 
Russia, where the applicant had alleged that the Jewish were plotting a conspiracy against 
the Russian people and ‘ascribed fascist ideology to the Jewish leadership’. 217 In its 
                                                 
209 Garaudy v. France, supra note 208, § 23. 
210 See on this Keane, ‘Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17’, supra note 198, at 651. 
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216 Keane, ‘Attacking Hate Speech under Article 17’, supra note 198, at 655. The case of Jersild, supra note 
106, was analysed under Article 10 ECHR because it did not concern a violation of the rights of the authors 
but the rights of the journalist reporting on the authors. 
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judgement, the Court concludes that ‘such a general and vehement attack on one ethnic group 
is in contradiction with the Convention’s underlying values notably tolerance, social peace 
and non-discrimination’. Hence, the applicant could not benefit from the protection afforded 
by Article 10.218 A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Norwood v. the United 
Kingdom, which had no connection to anti-Semitic thoughts but concerned, instead, the 
conviction of the applicant for displaying a contra-Islam poster in his window.219 This 
application was also declared inadmissible.220 Moreover, although Article 17 was not 
directly applied in the case of Leroy v. France, in its judgment to this case the Court implies 
that the scope of said Article covers ‘racism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia’.221 
Consequently, in the light of the Court’s case-law, it seems that nowadays Article 17 is 
directly applicable to more general cases of racial and religious discrimination, and not only 
to clear cases of Holocaust denial.222  
3.2.2 Critique of guillotine clause 
While some academic commentators refer to the ‘potential’ of Article 17 ECHR, others 
regard its application to pose problems.223 Some even strongly suggest that the Court should 
abstain from applying Article 17 altogether, both ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’.224 Those against 
at least the ‘direct’ application of Article 17 are mainly troubled by its ‘guillotine effect’. 
This term refers to Article 17’s aforementioned power to categorically exclude certain forms 
of expression from the protection of Article 10.225 Moreover, it has been claimed that in 
cases where the Court applies Article 17 directly, it relies too strongly on the assessment of 
the domestic authorities making also the content examination superficial.226 These radical 
effects have led some commentators to favour the ‘indirect’ application variant.227  
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On the other hand, it has been argued that there actually exists little difference between the 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ application of Article 17.228 This is allegedly due to the Strasbourg 
organs’ willingness to heavily rely on the national authorities’ assessment when applying 
Article 10. This follows from the fact that according to the Court’s case-law, the domestic 
authorities enjoy a wider ‘margin of appreciation’ when assessing the necessity of an 
interference in ‘hate speech’ cases.229 Hannes Cannie and Dirk Voorhoof have pointed out 
that, when applied together with Article 17, this wider ‘margin of appreciation’ –
considerably restricting the Court’s supervision power and the need for the domestic 
authorities to ‘pertinently and sufficiently’ justify the interferences – might trigger a weighty 
application of the abuse clause.230 Hence, also when relying on the ‘indirect’ application of 
Article 17, the Court’s analysis risks becoming categorically distorted since the strict 
requirements of proof following from Article 10(2) are made ‘redundant’. The worst-case 
scenario is that certain Member States take advantage of this in order to ‘restrict or prohibit 
with impunity the expression of unpopular views by those who do not espouse mainstream 
liberal positions’. This outcome would clearly be inconsistent with the aims of Article 10 
ECHR. For these reasons, the most extreme critics of Article 17 stress that it should not be 
applied at all.231  
 Application of Article 10  
3.3.1 Restricting different types of hate speech 
As already mentioned, the majority of ‘hate speech’ cases have been judged under Article 
10 ECHR.232 For example Perry Keller has stated that even when not adopted in connection 
to Article 17, Article 10 has afforded the Court ‘ample grounds’ to approve restrictions 
adopted at domestic level against expressions inciting hatred. With regard to different types 
of ‘hate speech’, the Court has stated, first of all, that Article 10 protection can be restricted 
concerning incitement to religious hatred or intolerance, including ‘gratuitously offensive 
attacks on matter regarded as sacred by believers’. Such statement was made, for example, 
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with regard to the case of Gündüz v. Turkey, which concerned statements made by a religious 
leader during a TV debate.233 Moreover, the Court has had an opportunity to address issues 
regarding the ‘glorification of terrorism’. The aforementioned case of Leroy v. France 
relating to the conviction of a cartoonist for his drawings published in a Basque weekly 
newspaper representing the attacks of 11 September 2001 with a caption stating ‘We have 
all dreamt of it... Hamas did it’ was the first of this kind. Although in Leroy the Court refers 
to Article 17 ECHR, it conducts the analysis of the case purely under Article 10(2) finding 
no violation of Article 10(1).  
In addition, the Court has considered under Article 10 cases of anti-constitutional or anti-
national hatred. Such was the situation, inter alia, in the aforementioned case of Sürek v. 
Turkey (No. 1).234 Recently, the Court also had an opportunity to deal with sexual orientation 
influenced ‘hate speech’. The case of Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden considered the 
distribution of pamphlets containing homophobic statements to the lockers of high school 
students. 235 The Court concluded that inciting to hatred does not always entail a call for an 
act of violence. It stated as follows:  
‘Attack on persons committed by insulting or slandering specific groups of the 
population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour combating racist 
speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible 
manner.’236 
Finally, as mentioned above, the Court has also dealt with negationism cases under Article 
10.237 However, most such cases and cases concerning outright Holocaust denial have been 
declared categorically inadmissible under Article 17 ECHR. This has influenced authors to 
conclude that a higher standard of protection is guaranteed against Holocaust denial than 
against other forms of ‘hate speech’.238 
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3.3.2 Content and context 
When applying Article 10 ECHR, one of the tests the Court must carry out is the 
aforementioned ‘necessity test’. When conducting this test the Court plays attention not only 
to the content of the allegedly impugned statements but also to the context in which they 
were made public. Context is crucial for the Court’s case-by-case analysis also in regard to 
the analysis of the proportionality of an interference.239 Therefore, when adopting Article 10 
analysis, the Court attempts to identify, first of all, the applicant’s intention. Was he or she 
seeking to inform the public about a matter of general interest?240 If this has been the case, 
the Court concludes that the respective interference with the applicant’s right was not 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. In contrast, if the remarks were specifically meant to 
incite to violence or hatred, the national authorities’ ‘margin of appreciation’ is wider and 
the Court is more likely to accept restrictions.241  
When considering the intent of the applicant, the Court takes into account the following 
facts: the applicant’s function or role in the society; the form of speech; and the impact it 
had. It usually starts its assessment with the applicant. As in other freedom of expression 
cases, also with regard to ‘hate speech’, special protection is afforded to politicians and 
members of the media. Consequently, if the applicant belongs to either of these groups, the 
domestic authorities’ ‘margin of appreciation’ is more restricted. Next, the Court analyses 
the medium used and the form of speech. This is vital as they have a direct effect on the 
impact of the message.242 For example, greater protection has been afforded to artistic forms 
of speech such as poetry or fictive literature.243 Memoirs and periodicals with limited 
distribution have also been afforded similar protection.244 Even when the statements are 
distributed by mass media, the Court has taken into account the circumstances of the relevant 
case and, for example, whether the author of the statement has had the opportunity to 
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rephrase them. Accordingly, in the case of Gündüz v. Turkey, protection was afforded to 
statements made during a heated TV debate.245 
With this regard, it should be noted that the Court has not been completely unanimous in 
emphasizing context when analysing the necessity of restrictions. Whilst some judges have 
been reluctant to afford the context as much significance as the majority, others have 
demonstrated willingness to put even greater weight on it. 246 The latter have suggested the 
application of the so-called ‘clear and present danger’ test, adopted in the US Constitutional 
jurisprudence.247 This idea was first introduced in the partly dissenting opinion of Judge 
Bonello in the case of Sürek (No. 1).248 Although this view was not adopted by the majority 
in said case, a clear reference to it was made later in the case of Erbakan v. Turkey, which 
concerned the conviction of politician for a public speech that had been given more than four 
years before the criminal charges against the applicant were brought.249 The Court concluded 
that the interference with the applicant’s right could not be regarded as necessary due to the 
fact that at the time of the prosecution there existed no ‘actual risk’ or ‘imminent danger’ for 
the society.250 However, the Court’s current stand on this approach remains somewhat 
unclear. Although it has been referred to in several opinions by the members of the Court, it 
has not been discussed by the majority since the case of Kiliç and Eren v. Turkey in 2011.251 
This case concerned the conviction of the two applicants for shouting slogans in support of 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The Court came to the conclusion that since the applicants 
had not caused clear and imminent danger there had been a violation of their Article 10 
rights. 252  
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Finally, as mentioned previously, the assessment of context is crucial also for the analysis of 
the proportionality of interference.253 Even if there exists no question as to the ‘hate speech’ 
nature of the comments, the Court might still find a breach of Article 10 ECHR if it concludes 
that the interference by the domestic authorities has been excessive. The Court has adopted 
a very strict approach, for example, with regard to preventive measures. It has stressed that 
due to the seriousness of a preventive interference, it is accepted only in very specific 
circumstances, and always requires the highest level of scrutiny by the Court.254 
Additionally, the Court practises particularly strict scrutiny in connection to criminal 
sanctions. However, the Court has accepted criminal sentences in the context of ‘hate 
speech’ provided that they are not being used in an excessive manner.255 For example, in its 
judgment concerning the case of Gündüz, the Court first recognized the severity of the 
sentence, which entailed four years of imprisonment, but then continued by noting that 
provisions for deterrent penalties might be necessary in certain democratic societies.256 
 Media’s Liability and Hate Speech 
3.4.1 Conviction of journalists 
As demonstrated above, in the case-law of the Court the press has been afforded special 
protection.257 However, the Court has also stated that members of the press are not immune 
to sanctions and may even face a prison sentence for press-related offences, although such a 
severe penalty must remain an exception.258 Accordingly, in all cases including journalists, 
their enhanced protection must be carefully balanced with their responsibilities and analysed 
in light of the circumstances of the case in question.  
An important case in this context is the case of Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, which 
concerned the conviction of two journalists for publishing a defamatory newspaper article 
and a cartoon.259 The applicants were sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment, denied 
                                                 
253 The analysis of the ‘prescribed by law’ criterion has been discussed above. See Part I, Section 1.2 Freedom 
of Expression in Practice, Classic case of Handyside. 
254 See, among other authorities, Dicle v. Turkey, Application no. 34685/97, 10 November 2004; Éditions Plon 
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257 See in Part I, Section 1.2 Freedom of Expression in Practice, Special protection afforded to media. 
258 See European Court of Human Rights, Research Division, ‘Internet: Case-law of the European Court of 
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4 January 2015, at 13.  
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certain civil rights, and prohibited from working as journalists for one year.260 In its analysis 
of the case, the Grand Chamber states the following: 
‘Imprisonment is a necessary and proportionate penalty for media subject to 
serious violations of other fundamental rights through defamatory or insulting 
statements, such as “hate speech”.’261  
Nonetheless, because this was a civil case, imprisonment was deemed a disproportionate 
interference with the applicants’ rights. In fact, since this ruling the Court and the other 
bodies of the Council have sought to abolish the possibility of prison sentences for journalists 
in defamation cases from the Member States’ legislations.262  
However, as suggested by the Court’s quoted statement in Cumpănă and Mazăre, in ‘hate 
speech’ related cases it has been more willing to accept even prison sentences. For example, 
in its judgment in the case of Mehmet Cevher Ilhan v. Turkey, the Court found that the 
restriction of journalist’s freedom of expression – for writing an article expressing hatred 
against women who refuse to use a veil – had been necessary.263 Importantly, it did not 
oppose the imposition of a prison sentence as such, but concluded that in this particular case 
the sanction of over two years of imprisonment was disproportionate due to its length.264 
Accordingly, it seems that in principle even journalists risk imprisonment in cases where 
they themselves are the authors of ‘hate speech’ content.  
3.4.2 Media’s liability for opinions of others 
The most central case concerning the classical media’s liability for ‘hate speech’ originated 
by a third party is the aforementioned case of Jersild v. Denmark.265 As mentioned 
previously, in this case the Court first concluded that the statements of the group interviewed 
by the applicant were more than insulting, and did not enjoy the protection of Article 10.266 
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However, according to the Court a significant feature of this case was that ‘the applicant did 
not make the objectionable statements himself’ but only assisted in their dissemination in 
his capacity as a television journalist.267 Taking this into account, the Court concluded that 
as the applicant’s aim had been to expose aspects of a matter of public concern rather than 
to propagate ‘racist views and ideas’, there had been a breach of his Article 10 rights.268 
Hence, in this case, the Court drew a line in applying ‘hate speech’ legislation to individuals 
purely ‘reporting the views of racists for a non-racist purpose’.269 This position is 
summarized well in the following statement by the Court: 
‘The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements 
made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the 
contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should 
not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so’.270  
On the other hand, in the aforementioned case of Sürek (No. 1) the Court did not give similar 
weight to this distinction.271 It concluded that ‘while it is true that the applicant did not 
personally associate himself with the views contained in the impugned letters, he 
nevertheless provided their writers with an outlet for stirring up violence and hatred’.272 The 
Court highlighted that as the owner of the review, the applicant possessed ‘the power to 
shape the editorial direction of the review’. For this reason, the Court found that the applicant 
was ‘vicariously subject’ to the duties and responsibilities of the press, which assume a 
greater importance in situations of conflict and tension than in typical situations.273 At first 
glance it, therefore, seems that the tense security situation in Southeast Turkey at the time of 
the events distinguishes this case from that of Jersild.274 It should be noted, however, that 
the Grand Chamber ruled on the case of Sürek (No. 1) on the same day as on twelve other 
cases against Turkey, four of which were brought by the same applicant.275 For example, the 
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case of Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey involved the conviction of the major shareholder and 
the editor-in-chief of a newspaper that had published interviews with the leader of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party. In connection to this case, the Court stated that ‘the interviews 
had a news-worthy content which allowed the public both to have an insight into the 
psychology of those who are driving force behind the opposition to official policy in 
Southeast Turkey and to assess the stakes involved in the conflict’. Thus, the interviews 
could not be considered to ‘incite to violence or hatred’ and interference with the applicants’ 
right had not been necessary.276 
These judgments illustrate the Court’s case-by-case approach well. Moreover, disparate 
rulings and the large number of dissenting opinions published in connection to these cases 
demonstrate the difficulties inherent to such analysis. Nonetheless, in the light of the 
aforementioned, it seems that the Court has managed to establish two central factors of which 
analysis justifies the disparate judgments in these printed media cases: (i) the amount of 
‘editorial control’ and (ii) the intent of the journalist.  
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 Observations on Established Rules and Principles 
To summarize Part I of my research, I will provide some observations regarding the Council 
of Europe’s approach towards the classic forms of ‘hate speech’ and media liability. Firstly, 
although I admire the pro-freedom of expression approach adopted in the United States, I 
concur with the Council of Europe and its attempt to counter ‘hate speech’. If carried out the 
right way, suppression of ‘hate speech’ does not supress freedom of expression.277 In this 
context, it is regrettable that the Council has not adopted legally binding and enforceable 
regulation concerning this approach. Although I welcome the numerous standard-setting text 
adopted by the different Council bodies and recognize their importance in taking forward 
the discussion, I feel that at least a legally binding definition of ‘hate speech’ is required. 
Existence of such a definition is crucial if the aim is to continue restricting and even 
completely excluding ‘hate speech’ from the protection of Article 10.278 As stated by 
McGonagle, the definition would ideally be provided by an international, legally binding 
treaty or related adjudicative authority, such as the Court’s case-law.279 Personally, I think 
the definition given in the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation on ‘hate speech’ could 
serve this purpose as this definition has previously been accepted by both the Court and the 
Council bodies representing all the Member States. 
Secondly, and regardless of whether there exists a legally binding definition of the key 
notion, I agree with critics of the so-called ‘guillotine clause’. In my view, the application of 
Article 17 ECHR jeopardizes freedom of speech by preventing certain types of speech from 
being analysed by the Court. As a result, the Court is unable to take into account the special 
circumstances of each case. For example, in the case of Jersild, the application of Article 17 
would likely have led to the Court finding no violation of the journalist’s Convention rights 
even if the ‘hate speech’ comments were made by third parties and the journalist’s intent 
was to report a matter of public concern.280 In my view, this contradicts the inherent 
principles of Article 10. Moreover, I find the critics’ fear of malpractice by the authorities, 
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particularly during difficult times and against unpopular views, to be well founded.281 In 
addition, I believe that all these risks posed by the application of Article 17 could, without 
any difficulties or significant impact on the final outcome, be adjudicated within the ‘speech-
protective framework’ of Article 10 by applying its ‘necessity test’.282 This would be in line 
with the significance given to the assessment of context in binding case-law of the Court. 
Therefore, I think the Court should refrain from applying the ‘guillotine clause’ in the future.  
Thirdly, I approve of the special protection afforded to the media under Article 10. I agree 
with the Council bodies and the Court’s finding that this protection is a vital element of a 
truly democratic society. However, this special status is rightly coupled with special 
responsibilities. In the Court’s case-law this has been demonstrated by the imposition of 
liability on the press even concerning third party authored content. As mentioned previously, 
in these liability decisions, the Court has placed considerable weight on the intent of the 
journalist. For example, in the case of Jersild, the lack of intent to spread racist views led to 
the protection of the journalist’s work by Article 10.283 On the other hand, it seems that the 
Court has also emphasised the amount of ‘editorial control’ practiced. The absence of such 
control led to the finding of a breach of Article 10 in the case of Gündüz, whereas in the case 
of Sürek (No.1), the opposite circumstances justified the Court’s finding of no violation.284 
Accordingly, despite their different approaches to freedom of speech, in this context the 
Council of Europe’s and the US courts’ practices concerning the liability of the traditional 
media seem surprisingly similar.285 Consequently, I consider it likely that also in Europe this 
approach is not applied as straightforwardly with regard to ICTs.286 This is due to the fact 
that the application of this approach to printed media cases is relatively simple because the 
publisher with the actual ‘editorial control’ can usually be easily identified. However, the 
same does not always apply with regard to ICTs. It is interesting to see, how this challenge 
has been overcome by the Council.  
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PART II: COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND INTERNET 
 Cyberspace Challenges 
 Court and Unique Features of Internet 
To date, the Court has dealt with only a few cases involving issues of online freedom of 
expression, and its case-law concerning the Internet continues to evolve. However, the Court 
has already acknowledged that special measures may have to be adopted (and applied 
alongside the principles originally established for traditional media) in response to the 
unique features of the Internet. The first influential case to be mentioned in this connection 
is the case of Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v. the United Kingdom, which concerned 
the storing of a defamatory newspaper article in a publicly accessible online archive.287 In 
this case, the Court noted for the first time that the ‘accessibility’ of the Internet and its 
‘capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information’ make it an important tool 
‘in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information 
generally’.288 I will return to this case later.289 
The participatory dimension inherent to online speech was first recognized by the Court in 
the case of Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey.290 This case concerned the blocking of the Google Sites 
in Turkey because one webpage uploaded in the service was deemed to entail impugned 
material. In its analysis, the Court states that ‘the Internet has now become one of the 
principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and 
information, providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions 
concerning political issues and issues of general interest’.291 The Court concluded that the 
act of blocking a group of websites amounted to collateral and prior censorship. After noting 
that, according to the principles established regarding classical media, prior censorship of 
publications requires the highest level of scrutiny by the Court and can rarely be accepted, 
the Court found a violation of Article 10.292  
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Moreover, in the case of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, the Court 
explicitly compared the status of the Internet to that of the traditional press.293 The case 
concerned the reprinting of a defamatory letter acquired from the Internet in a newspaper.294 
The Court started by recognizing the fact that the Internet has features that clearly distinguish 
it from the traditional press, in particular its capacity to store and transmit information. The 
Court acknowledged that due to these features, wrongful content posted online can cause 
more harm to the enjoyment of individuals’ rights than content published in the printed 
media. Following from this, the Court concluded that ‘policies governing reproduction of 
material from the printed media and the Internet may differ’ and the latter have to be adjusted 
according to specific features of this technology.295  
Finally, in the case of Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, the Court took note of the 
Internet’s capacity to multiply the impact of the information it stores.296 This case concerned 
a poster campaign entailing a link to a website, where an association behind the campaign 
endorsed criminal offences. In its judgement, the Court stresses that mere references to 
harmful Internet sources in public places can have a large negative impact on, for example, 
public morals. Accordingly, the Court found no violation of Article 10 by the respondent 
State, which had prohibited the publication of the campaign.297 
 Additional Challenge: American safe haven 
As demonstrated above, the US approach towards ‘hate speech’ differs radically from that 
of the Council of Europe.298 The First Amendment of the US Constitution offers 
considerably wider protection to those posting hateful online content.299 However, the 
Internet makes information accessible globally. If an individual or a business disagrees with 
the rules in one country, operations can easily be moved to a more lenient jurisdiction 
without closing the website in the State of origin.300 Consequently, European legislative 
efforts to control ‘hate speech’ are limited by the inability of the European countries’ to gain 
jurisdiction over US based operators posting or permitting the posting of ‘cyber hate’.301 
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Today, online hate-mongers shelter themselves from legal liability by situating their 
operations in the United States.302 Perhaps the most well-known example of this problem is 
the case of Yahoo! Inc., initially judged in France.303 In this case the plaintiffs, student unions 
la Ligue Contre le Rasicme et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA) and Union des Etudiants Juifs de 
France (UEJF), brought a claim against Internet operator Yahoo! because it had allowed the 
sale of Nazi memorabilia through its online action site.304 After consulting several experts, 
the French court issued an interim decision according to which Yahoo! should filter the 
material on its French site, preventing French users from accessing material prohibited by 
French law.305 
Dissatisfied with this decision, Yahoo! successfully filed a motion for declaratory judgment 
in the United States in order to prohibit the enforcement of the French order.306 In its 
judgment, the District Court concludes that it cannot ‘enforce a foreign order that violates 
the protections of the United States Constitution’ by chilling protected speech that occurs 
simultaneously inside the United States.307 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
ruled that there was an insufficient amount of contact between the United States and the 
applicants, LICRA and UEJF, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.308 This case 
demonstrates well the problems inherent to the enforcement of European standards 
concerning the Internet. However, following the declaratory judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, Yahoo! announced that it would voluntarily ban all auctions of Nazi memorabilia 
through its site.309 This implies that actions such as mobilizing relevant stakeholders to take 
self-regulatory measures to tackle ‘hate speech’ may prove an effective alternative method 
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of controlling cross Atlantic ‘cyber hate’ when legal attempts to do so fail. This has been 
acknowledged also in the strategies adopted in the auspices of the Council of Europe.  
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 Adopted Strategies: cyber hate and online liability 
 Treaty-Based Strategies 
2.1.1 Cybercrime Convention and Additional Protocol 
The most relevant treaty-based text in the context of this research could be the Cybercrime 
Convention of 2001, which aims to achieve a common policy to protect societies against 
cybercrime.310 However, this instrument has been heavily criticized for failing to address 
problems of online racism and xenophobia.311 This shortcoming stems from the influence of 
the United States in the drafting of the convention. The initial draft included provisions 
aiming to regulate Internet-based incitement to hatred, but these were removed after the 
United States indicated that it would not sign the convention with these provisions.312 In 
order to rectify this shortfall, the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime 
concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through 
computer systems (hereinafter ‘the Additional Protocol’) was drawn up and attached to the 
convention in 2003.313  
According to its Explanatory Report, the Additional Protocol aims to harmonize ‘substantive 
criminal law in the fight against racism and xenophobia on the Internet’ and improve 
international co-operation in this area.314 It requires State Parties to adopt and enforce 
effective measures to criminalize various types of racist conduct committed via computer 
systems. The types of targeted conduct include (i) dissemination of racist and xenophobic 
material to the public, (ii) making racist and xenophobic motivated threats or insults, (iii) 
distributing to the public material that denies or approves genocide or crimes against 
humanity, (iv) and aiding or abetting any of these crimes.315 All of these offences must be 
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committed intentionally to amount criminal liability.316 Moreover, the acts must have been 
committed without a right. According to the Explanatory Report, this refers to ‘conduct taken 
without authority’ or to ‘conduct that is otherwise not covered by established legal defences, 
excuses, justifications or relevant principles under domestic law’.317 The idea behind this 
provision is to leave unaffected all conduct undertaken by authorities in context of their 
operations, and any conduct concerning, for example, ‘legitimate and common activities 
inherent in the design of networks, or legitimate and common operating or commercial 
practices’.318 State Parties may determine how these exemptions are implemented within 
their domestic legal systems.319 I will now shortly analyse the established offences in more 
detail. 
Article 3 of the Additional Protocol requires State Parties to adopt necessary legislative and 
other measures to establish ‘distributing or otherwise making available, racist and 
xenophobic material to the public through a computer system’ as criminal offences. Several 
things should be noted about this provision. Firstly, the required ‘intent’ must be directed 
not only to the act of dissemination, but also to the ‘racist and xenophobic character of the 
material’.320 Secondly, the term ‘distribution’ refers to the ‘active dissemination’ of 
impugned material, whereas ‘making available’ refers to the placing of this material online. 
The latter term also covers ‘the creation or compilation of hyperlinks in order to facilitate 
access to such material’.321 Thirdly, it should be noted that the phrase ‘to the public’ excludes 
emails and private messages from the scope of this Article. However, according to the 
Explanatory Report, exchanging prohibited material in chat rooms or posting such material 
in newsgroups may fall under the scope of this Article, even if accessing the relevant content 
requires a password. The only prerequisite for this is that the password would be given to 
anyone who meets certain predetermined criteria set by the online operator.322 Finally, it is 
worth noting that State Parties are not obliged to criminalize acts where the material 
advocating discrimination is not associated with hatred or violence as long as other effective 
remedies are available for dealing with such acts. In addition, criminalization of the latter 
type of speech is not obligatory if it runs against the legal principles adopted in a State Party. 
                                                 
316 Explanatory Report to Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 314, § 25.  
317 Ibid, § 24 and McGonagle, ‘A Survey and Critical Analysis’, supra note 94, at 471. 
318 The intended operations of authorities include, inter alia, operations where the respective Government is 
acting to maintain public order, protect national security, or investigate criminal offences. 
319 Explanatory Report to Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 314, § 24. 
320 Ibid, § 27. 
321 Ibid, § 28. 
322 Ibid, § 31. 
59 
 
A State Party may also further restrict the scope of its reservation by requiring that the 
‘discrimination is, for instance, insulting, degrading, or threatening a group of persons’.323 
Some commentators have regarded this as endorsement of ‘self- and co-regulatory 
complaints and sanctioning mechanisms’. However, the Additional Protocol or the 
Explanatory Report do not elaborate on this possibility.324  
Article 4 of the Additional Protocol addresses the racist and xenophobic motivated threats. 
It covers threats made in both private and public communication, unlike Article 5, which 
only covers racist and xenophobic motivated ‘insults’ made in public communication. 
According to the Explanatory Report, ‘insult’ refers to ‘any offensive, contemptuous or 
invective expression which prejudices the honour and dignity of a person’.325 At first glance, 
this specification seems to contradict the principle established in Handyside according to 
which freedom of expression covers information and ideas that ‘offend, shock or disturb the 
State or any sector of population’.326 However, this conflict has been circumvented by 
interpreting said Article in accordance with the Court’s case-law. Distinguishing between 
‘insults without racist character’ and ‘racists insults’ is key, where the latter is regarded as 
qualitatively more severe.327 Additionally, Article 5 states that State Parties may require that 
the insult exposed the victim to ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’.328 Moreover, State Parties 
may reserve the right to not apply this Article at all.329 Finally, Article 6 requires the 
criminalization of ‘denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide or 
crimes against humanity’. Similarly to the aforementioned Articles, this Article states that a 
State Party may require that the act is committed ‘with the intent to incite hatred, 
discrimination or violence’ against others based on prohibited criteria, or reserve the right to 
not apply this Article.330 
These Articles show the comprehensive scope of the Additional Protocol. Unfortunately, to 
date only 23 States have ratified the Protocol, limiting its impact.331 However, in this context 
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it is important to note that although all European Union Member States have not ratified the 
Additional Protocol, they are all subject to the Council of the European Union’s Framework 
Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means 
of criminal law.332 This Decision requires even broader domestic legislation criminalizing 
incitement to hatred and covers the main objectives of the Additional Protocol.333 Moreover, 
with regard to liability issues in general, the European Union Member States are also subject 
to the EU E-Commerce Directive.334 This Directive is central for my analysis, because the 
Court has to assess its applicability when judging the defamation case of Delfi.335 Therefore, 
I will now shortly analyse and compare the stand on liability of the Additional Protocol and 
said Directive. 
2.1.2 Liability under Additional Protocol and EU E-Commerce Directive 
The Additional Protocol to Convention on Cybercrime primarily imposes liability on 
individuals and businesses engaging in prohibited conduct. This liability is intended to be 
predominantly criminal, but additional civil liability is not excluded. In fact, it has been 
specifically mentioned as an option in relation to the ‘distribution or otherwise making 
available’ of racist and xenophobic material.336 Moreover, the requirement of ‘intent’ 
associated with all listed offences is supposed to limit the liability of an online operator 
serving as a mere ‘conduit, cache or host’ for impugned material (in other words ‘host 
providers’). These entities are also not required to monitor conduct on their services.337 
However, this rule can be circumvented since neither the Additional Protocol nor the 
Explanatory Report defines the notion of ‘intention’. This was expressly left for the national 
authorities to decide.338 Furthermore, the Explanatory Report states that ‘although the 
transmission of racist and xenophobic material through the Internet requires the assistance 
of service provider as a conduit, a service provider that does not have the criminal intent 
cannot incur liability under this section’.339 In other words, liability of ‘access providers’ 
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requires acknowledged aiding of a crime. It is crucial to note that the Additional Protocol 
does not take a stand on the liability of ‘content providers’. 
Similarly to the Additional Protocol, Article 12 of the EU E-Commerce Directive states that 
a service provider is not liable for the wrongful information it transmits provided that it, (i) 
‘does not initiate the transmission’, (ii) ‘does not select the receiver of the transmission’, and 
(iii) ‘does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission’.340 Moreover, 
Article 15 of the same Directive establishes that Member States may ‘not impose a general 
obligation on providers… to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity’. 
However, although the Directive restricts the liability of ISPs in principle, it also imposes on 
them some specific responsibilities. Article 14 of the Directive states that service providers 
are not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient provided that they do 
not have ‘actual knowledge of illegal activity or information’ and, regarding claims for 
damages, are not ‘aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or 
information is apparent’. Moreover, service providers are not liable if they, ‘upon 
obtaining… knowledge or awareness’ of illegal content, act ‘expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to the information’. It is important to note that according to Recital 42 of the 
Directive, the Directive only covers cases where activity of the operator is limited to ‘mere 
technical, passive and automatic nature’. Accordingly, similarly to the Additional Protocol, 
the EU E-Directive leaves ‘content providers’ outside the definition of ISPs and does not 
elaborate on their liability. 
 Standard-Setting Texts 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance  
ECRI has regularly called for greater monitoring of the dissemination of racists expressions 
via the Internet, and for appropriate prosecution of those responsible for such dissemination. 
This aim is reflected, above all, in ECRI’s country monitoring work, but it has also been 
addressed in GPR No. 6 on combating the dissemination of racist, xenophobic and anti-
Semitic material via the Internet.341 In this GPR, ECRI recommends, inter alia, strengthening 
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international co-operation and ensuring the applicability of domestic criminal legislation in 
the field of dissemination of ‘racist, xenophobic and antisemitic material offences committed 
via the Internet’. Furthermore, Member States are encouraged to train their law enforcement 
authorities to deal with the problems associated with this type of dissemination, consider 
establishing a specialist ‘consultation body’, and support related existing initiatives. 
Interestingly, already in this document adopted in 2000, ECRI recommends the clarification 
of the responsibility issues concerning ‘content hosts’, ‘content providers’ and ‘site 
publishers’. The document also stresses the importance of supporting the Internet industry 
in adopting self-regulatory measures, and of increasing public awareness of problems 
associated with the dissemination of illegal material.342 
Committee of Ministers 
The Committee of Ministers has actively sought to adopt standard-setting texts on ‘cyber 
hate’ and online liability.343 Online ‘hate speech’ is mentioned in a Declaration adopted by 
the Committee in 2005.344 In this Declaration, the Committee urges Member States to ensure 
that their domestic legislation combatting illegal content, for example, racism and racial 
discrimination, applies equally to offences committed via traditional media and ICTs. 
However, simultaneously, Member States should ‘enhance legal and practical measures to 
prevent state and private censorship’. In this context, the Committee reminds Member States 
to encourage private sector actors to adopt ‘self- and co-regulation frameworks’ in order to 
ensure their commitment to protection of online freedom of expression.345  
Also with regard to liability issues in general, the Committee has emphasized the importance 
of self-regulation and co-operation between authorities and relevant stakeholders.346 The 
most important text regarding liability is the Declaration on freedom of communication on 
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the Internet, adopted in 2003.347 In this Declaration, the Committee states that obligations to 
monitor Internet content or to actively seek ‘facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity’ 
should not be imposed on service providers. Accordingly, ISPs should not be held liable for 
any content that they merely transmit or provide access to. The only situation in which these 
‘access providers’ can be held co-responsible is when their operations go beyond 
transmission or providing access and they fail to ‘act expeditiously’ to remove or block 
content after becoming aware of its illegal nature or, in the event of a claim for damages, of 
‘facts or circumstances revealing’ this illegality.348 Moreover, ‘intermediaries’ purely 
hosting content produced by third parties should not, in principle, be held liable for such 
content. An exemption can be made if it is proved that the ‘host provider’ was aware of the 
illegal content or, in cases where there is a claim for damages, of facts revealing its illegality. 
These conditions should, however, be outlined in national law.349 Caution should also be 
applied when imposing liability on ISPs for not removing content expeditiously subject to a 
request. This is important especially noting the risks inherent to the removal of completely 
legitimate content.350 In addition, the Committee takes a stand on anonymity by stressing 
that Member States need to respect the choice of Internet users not to disclose their identity 
provided that they are not engaging in criminal activities.351 All in all, this Declaration is a 
powerful statement that excludes ISPs, namely ‘access providers and ‘host providers’, from 
liability. As such, it is in line with Articles 12 to 15 of the EU E-Commerce Directive 
discussed above.352  
Similarly to the Additional Protocol and the EU E-Commerce Directive, the Committee 
Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet leaves ‘content providers’ outside 
the ‘limited liability regime’ that applies to ISPs. However, the following question remains: 
When is an entity defined as an ‘intermediary’ ISP? An important text in this regard is the 
Committee’s Recommendation on a new notion of media.353 In this Recommendation, the 
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Committee recognizes that the emergence of ICTs has created a need to adopt a new and 
broader notion of media. The Recommendation introduces more detailed criteria and 
indicators as to which entities are considered to belong this new category.354 An entity is 
considered part of the new media category if it shows: (i) ‘intent to act as media’, (ii) 
‘purpose and underlying objectives of media’, (iii) practice of editorial control, (iv) 
adherence to professional standards, (v) notable outreach and dissemination, and (vi) public 
expectation as to media value.355 These criteria are not of equal weight. An entity will 
automatically not be regarded as media if it does not meet the core criteria of purpose, 
editorial control, or outreach and dissemination.356 Meeting core criteria is a feature 
presumed to distinguish media from ‘intermediaries’ and ‘auxiliaries’, where these latter 
entities tend not to meet all said criteria. However, due to the active role of ‘intermediaries’ 
in mass communication, the Recommendation instructs Member States to consider 
‘intermediaries’ in their media-related policy.357 Nevertheless, first and foremost, the 
Recommendation stresses the need to review the regulatory frameworks with regard to the 
‘new media’ actors. It stresses that the relevant safeguards against unjustified interferences, 
‘which risk leading to undue self-restraint or self-censorship’, must be extended to them.358 
Consequently, to balance the special safeguards, these actors should be required to show 
diligence similar to that required from media professionals.359 The following is stated 
specifically regarding ‘hate speech’:  
‘Media should refrain from conveying hate speech and other content that 
incites violence or discrimination for whatever reason. Special attention is 
needed on the part of actors operating collective online shared spaces which 
are designed to facilitate interactive mass communication. They should be 
attentive to the use of, and editorial response to, expressions motivated by 
racist, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, misogynist, sexist (including as regards 
LGBT people) or other bias...’360 
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Parliamentary Assembly  
Similarly to the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly has been active in 
adopting texts regarding ICT-based media.361 In an early Resolution adopted in 1999, the 
Assembly calls Member States and the EU to pass laws in order to control the ‘inevitable 
flood of information technology crimes’, and to encourage the use of ICT-based media and 
the adoption of codes of conduct and ethical codes for this type of media.362 In 2001, the 
Assembly adopted a further Recommendation concerning racism and xenophobia in 
cyberspace.363 This Recommendation urges quick adaption of the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on Cybercrime and encourages discussion with ISPs ‘to convince them of the 
need to take steps themselves to combat the existence of racist sites’.364 It also makes a very 
interesting suggestion ‘on the ethical level’. It recommends that self-disciplinary efforts of 
‘access providers’ and ‘hosts’ should be made a norm by ‘labelling and classifying sites, 
setting up hotlines, filtering, drawing up rules of conduct and including clauses in contracts 
with technical providers prohibiting their clients from using their services for unlawful 
purposes’.365  
On the other hand, the Assembly has also stressed that online ‘intermediaries’ should be held 
responsible for unlawful content only ‘if they are the author of such content or have the 
obligation under national law to remove unlawful third-party content’.366 On the contrary, 
concerning media actors, the Assembly has specifically emphasized the duties of journalists 
in the changing technological environment. It has noted that journalists’ new ability to cross 
international borders with ease also brings with it new demands ‘such as requiring new skills, 
greater knowledge and ongoing training’.367 
Ministerial Conference  
The Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy has also actively addressed issues 
regarding ‘cyber hate’ and liability. However, compared to other bodies, the Conference has 
had a greater emphasis on protecting freedom of expression. The Ministers’ most active 
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engagement concerning ‘cyber hate’ was taken in their Fifth Conference held in 1997.368 In 
Conference Resolution No. 2, Member States are called to ensure that measures combating 
the dissemination of incitement to ‘racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism and all forms of 
intolerance’ through ICTs ‘duly respect freedom of expression and, where applicable, the 
secrecy of correspondence’.369 In addition, Member States should reinforce co-operation 
within the Council of Europe in order to find solutions at the European and global level ‘to 
problems of delimiting public and private forms of communication, liability, jurisdiction and 
conflict of laws in regard to “hate speech” disseminated through the new communications 
and information services’.370 The Conference Action Plan proposes ‘periodical evaluation’ 
of the Member States ‘follow-up’ on the relevant recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers’, such as the twin recommendations adopted in 1997.371  
Moreover, in the Seventh Conference organized in 2005, the Ministers noted the problems 
inherent to imposing liability on Internet ‘intermediaries’. In this context, Action Plan for 
the Conference recommends that Member States, where necessary, ‘take any initiative, 
including the preparation of guidelines, inter alia, on the roles and responsibilities of 
“intermediaries” and other Internet actors in ensuring freedom of expression’.372 On the other 
hand, in the Conference of 2013, organized under the new name of Ministers Responsible 
for Media and Information Society, the Ministers note the role of media operators in the 
dissemination of ‘cyber hate’ and in fostering ethical journalism both offline and online. The 
Conference Political Declaration notes the ‘widespread and growing phenomenon’ of online 
‘hate speech’ requiring concerted action at ‘national and transnational levels’.373   
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 Online Liability for Wrongful Content in Practice 
 State Liability 
As mentioned previously, in the context of liability (online or otherwise), the failure to 
ensure the protection of ‘human rights’ is always primarily attributable to a State Party to 
the relevant ‘human rights’ instrument. This is due to the nature of ‘human rights’ discussed 
in the beginning of this research.374 Accordingly, the positive obligations of the Member 
States of the Council require them to ensure that actions of ISPs do not violate the rights of 
others. The Court discussed this issue in the case of K.U. v. Finland, which concerned the 
posting of an advertisement in the name of a 12-year-old boy by an anonymous person on 
an online dating site. At the time of the offence, Finnish law did not permit ordering the 
dating site operator to identify the offender.375 In its judgment, the Court states the following: 
‘Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of communications are primary 
considerations and users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a 
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression will be respected, such 
guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate 
imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others’.376  
The Court concluded that the authorities had breached the child’s right to private life, 
because they had failed to fulfil their positive obligation to effectively ‘reinforce the 
deterrent effect of criminalisation by applying criminal law provisions in practice through 
effective investigation and prosecution’.377 This same positive obligation justifies the 
imposition of liabilities on different online operators.378 
 Liability of Internet Service Providers 
3.2.1 Definition of user-generated online content 
Before analysing the possible imposition of liability on ISPs (or any other entities) for user-
generated online content, I must try to define this content. As stated by the Head of 
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Department for Legal Information of European Audio-visual Observatory, Susanne 
Nikoltchev:  
‘From the rise of blogs which allowed private individuals to publish content 
on their own platform, to the opening of comment sections at the end of 
newspaper articles, to the inclusion of user-generated films in news reports, 
the “professional” media have come to absorb user-generated content as a 
supplementary source of content’.379 
Tarlach McGonagle has defined user-generated content as ‘means facilitating individual 
engagement with the media, both in production of content and in reaction to content’. This 
type of content can be created individually, but more often it is the result of collaborative 
work between several individuals.380 Moreover, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development established in its 2007 report three characteristics inherent to 
user-generated content. These characteristics are the following: (i) that the content has been 
published, (ii) that ‘certain amount of creative effort has been put into creating the work or 
adapting existing works to construct a new one’, and (iii) that the content has been ‘created 
outside of professional routines and practices’.381 The first important legal question 
regarding user-generated content concerns the level of protection afforded to its creators. As 
mentioned previously, according to Karol Jakubowicz, if the content ‘fulfils the democratic 
functions ascribed to media and journalists’, its creators should be able to enjoy – at least to 
some extent – the enhanced freedom afforded to the press.382 However, in this situation, 
these ‘new media’ actors are also ‘expected to adhere to similar ethical standards and values’ 
as actual media professionals.383 Nonetheless, for my research, the relevant question is the 
following: Can online operators be held responsible for user-generated content they allow? 
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3.2.2 ISPs as Gate-keepers: example of Blogger 
As mentioned previously, although ISPs, namely ‘host providers’ and ‘access providers’, are 
subject to a ‘limited liability regime’, all online operators might carry out functions that can 
be described as media-like or editorial. For example, Karol Jakubowicz has argued that 
‘intermediaries’ often perform ‘a gate-keeping role’ in freedom of expression.384 First of all, 
they can apply guidelines such as ‘house rules’ or ‘content policy’ outlining the kind of 
content their users are allowed to disseminate through their services. A good example is 
Google, Inc., which has adopted the following ‘content policy’ on user-generated ‘hate 
speech’ on its web-blog tool Blogger: 
‘Hate Speech: Our products are platforms for free expression. But we don’t 
support content that promotes or condones violence against individuals or 
groups based on race or ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, 
nationality, veteran status or sexual orientation/gender identity, or whose 
primary purpose is inciting hatred on the basis of these core characteristics. 
This can be a delicate balancing act but, if the primary purpose is to attack a 
protected group, the content crosses the line.’385 
The idea behind such policies is that if the content posted on the service does not conform 
to the criteria outlined, it risks being moderated. This type of moderation inevitably requires 
editorial judgment and may lead to removal of the content, ‘depriving its author of a chance 
to reach an audience, and the audience of access to the contents’.386 As mentioned 
previously, different types of moderation can be used for this purpose.387 One, and perhaps 
the most extreme method, is ‘pre-moderation’, which entails revision of the user-generated 
content prior to publication. A related method is ‘post-moderation’, which allows immediate 
publication of content, although moderators may ‘review, make changes or delete the content 
after it has been posted’. Another method is ‘peer-based moderation’, which also allows 
immediate publication of user-generated content provided that it can be ‘edited, reviewed or 
even deleted by certain or all users of the same platform’.388 The ‘notice-and-takedown-
button’ is a widely used example of the latter type of moderation.389 Other service users may 
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report offensive content using this button and the content is then reviewed by the service 
provider. This system is used, for example, in Google’s Blogger tool, where the following 
statement regarding enforcement of ‘content policy’ can be found:  
‘If you encounter a blog that you believe violates our content policies, please 
report it to us using the “Report Abuse” link… Our team reviews these flags 
for policy violations. If the blog does not violate our policies, we will not take 
any action against the blog or blog owner.’ 390 
Additionally, ISPs can enforce ‘terms of use’ that ‘introduce a vast array of rules pertaining 
to content and expression on the Internet’. According to Jakubowicz, this effectively ‘invests 
ISPs with a “regulatory” function and gives ISP rules a “media law-like effect”’.391 
Accordingly, imposing some liability on ISPs for user-generated content might be justifiable 
given their ability to extensively moderate the disseminated content. 392 
3.2.3 Liability for user-generated content 
The situation becomes problematic in terms of freedom of expression if liabilities are 
imposed on ISPs with the consequence that they start to restrict online speech more than 
what is required by law. Extensive restriction of online content is tempting for service 
providers, because it maximizes their chances of avoiding liability for third-party-content. 
Academic commentators have voiced their concerns about this kind of ‘privatisation of 
censorship’. For example, Damian Tambini has stressed that online self-regulation 
potentially imposes undesired limits on freedom of expression, which might lead to ‘a clash 
between freedom-of-expression rights such as they are laid out in Article 10 ECHR, and the 
limitations on speech imposed by self-regulatory bodies’.393 Accordingly, any imposition of 
liability requires extremely careful consideration of the individual circumstances of each 
case.  
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One way of balancing ISPs’ right to freedom of expression and their liabilities could be to 
accompany the awareness of illegal content requirement with a ‘duty of diligence’ meaning 
the application of requirement ‘knew or should have known of the illegal content’.394 ECRI 
has suggested the adaption of this requirement regarding ‘host providers’ in its General 
Conclusions regarding the dissemination of racist messages via the Internet, adopted in 
2000.395 These Conclusions state the following:  
‘ECRI underlines the necessity of making distinction between the function of 
access provider and that of host provider and of clearly establishing their 
respective responsibilities. While the access provider should be held liable for 
illegal content of which it was aware and which it had not blocked, the host 
provider should have a wide duty of diligence as regards especially those sites 
which it hosts anonymously and free of charge.’396 
 Media’s Online Liability 
3.3.1 Journalists writing online 
Imposing liability is less problematic with regard to online media actors, especially when 
they are the originators of the impugned material. This is due to the fact that, as discussed 
previously, the Court has in its case-law afforded the press enhanced protection, which is, 
however, coupled with increased responsibilities.397 The very same principles seem to be 
applied to online publications, as demonstrated in the aforementioned case of Times 
Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2).398 In this case, the Court analysed whether a common law 
rule, which states that each publication of a defamatory statement raises a separate cause for 
action, should be applied to online publications. In practice, this would mean that a new 
cause of action accrues each time the same defamatory material is accessed online. 
Specifically, this case concerned two news reports on a money-laundering scheme carried 
out by an alleged Russian mafia boss. Both articles were published in the newspaper as well 
as on the newspaper’s website. An action for libel was brought forward in relation to the 
                                                 
394 See the principles established in the US legal praxis with regard to classical media and the so-called 
‘secondary publishers’. See Introduction, Section 2.2.2.1 Traditional media. 
395 General Conclusions, ‘Legal Instruments to Combat Racism on the Internet’, report prepared by the Swiss 
Institute of Comparative Law, Strasbourg, August 2000, CRI (2000) 27. 
396 Ibid, § 4. 
397See Part I, Section 1.2 Freedom of Expression in Practice, Special protection afforded to media. 
398 Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v. the United Kingdom, supra note 287. See ‘Internet: Case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, supra note 258, at 12. See in Part II, Section 1.1 Court and Unique Features 
of Internet. 
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newspaper’s Internet archive, where past issues of the paper continued to be accessible to 
readers. The Court found no violation of Article 10 ECHR. It agreed with the domestic 
court’s view that continued access to the articles amounted to libel.399 In its analysis, the 
Court stresses that a greater ‘margin of appreciation’ is to be afforded to States in cases 
regarding news archives than with regard to news reporting of current affairs. Moreover, 
according to the Court, the obligation to publish a qualification to the impugned articles did 
not constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression, particularly since 
the newspaper had been aware of the pending libel proceedings.400 Some commentators have 
suggested that this judgment should be interpreted in a way that liberates media from liability 
whenever it is not aware of the impugned nature of archived content. Thus, any obligation 
to constantly review archives would be in breach of Article 10.401 
Another interesting case is the case of Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, concerning criminal 
proceedings related to a newspaper article and online forum posts that questioned the events 
related to a war in which hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians died. 402 The applicant had signed 
the article, but denied authorship of the posts. Domestic courts convicted the applicant of 
defamation. In its analysis of the case, the Court accepts that the applicant’s authorship of 
the forum posts had been verified beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court states 
that because the applicant made the posts ‘without relying on any relevant factual basis, he 
might have failed to comply with the journalistic duty to provide accurate and reliable 
information’. Therefore, with this judgment the Court established that the principle of 
‘responsible journalism’ extends beyond journalists’ employer’s websites.403 However, after 
analysing the content of the texts, the Court found that they did not undermine the dignity of 
the victims and survivors of the war. Accordingly, in this case the Court concluded that the 
domestic courts had not given ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons for convicting the 
applicant.404 Accordingly, with regard to online material authored by journalists, the Court 
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has had no difficulties in applying the same principles as in printed media cases. However, 
the situation is more complicated concerning media’s liability for user-generated online 
content. 
3.3.2 Liability for user-generated content 
3.3.2.1 Court’s approach on media’s liability for user-generated content 
The Court has had the opportunity to discuss the liability of journalists for user-generated 
online content only a few times. One such judgment was given in the aforementioned case 
of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel, which concerned the reprinting of an 
anonymous online letter, which accused local authorities of engaging in corruption and 
criminal activities.405 The article published by the applicant company referenced the original 
source of information and included a note of caution from the editorial board indicating that 
the information in the letter might be false. Thus, the newspaper clearly distanced itself from 
the information presented in the letter. According to Ukrainian law at the time of the case, 
journalists could not be held liable for reproducing material published elsewhere in the press. 
However, such immunity did not apply with regard to unregistered website sources. 
Furthermore, no domestic rules existed on registration of Internet media. In its analysis of 
the case, the Court seems to suggest that the press should not be held liable for third party 
content published online if it clearly states that the views expressed are that of the third 
party.406 However, a key element in this case was the lack of legal framework, which 
hampered the press’ ability to function as a ‘public watchdog’. 407 This led the Court to find 
a violation of Article 10 ECHR. Consequently, the Court imposed a positive obligation on 
all States to provide legal regulation allowing the press to exercise freedom of expression on 
the Internet without interference.408  
The ruling in Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel, is relevant because it invited the 
Member States to ‘rethink of familiar principles of media freedom and regulation’, and adapt 
them to the ‘expansive, global context of the Internet’.409 However, the most relevant case 
                                                 
405 See in Part II, Section 1.1 Court and Unique Features of Internet. Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and 
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concerning media’s liability for user-generated online content is the case that inspired this 
whole research: Delfi As v. Estonia.410 
3.3.2.2 Delfi AS v. Estonia 
First section judgment 
The case of Delfi AS v. Estonia exemplifies well how the liability related rules and principles 
outlined during this research are applied in practice.411 The First Section of the Court begun 
its analysis of this case by acknowledging that (unlike the comments in question) the news 
article published on Delfi’s news portal was balanced and addressed a topic of a certain 
degree of public interest. However, the First Section took the view that Delfi should have 
realized that this article ‘might cause negative reactions’ against the shipping company and 
its managers. Furthermore, there was ‘a higher-than-average risk that the negative comments 
could go beyond the boundaries of acceptable criticism and reach the level of gratuitous 
insult or hate speech’. The First Section concluded that Delfi should have exercised a degree 
of caution to avoid liability for said comments.412 The First Section then examined the 
measures taken by Delfi to manage readers’ comments in general. In particular, it noted that 
Delfi had utilized an ‘automatic filter’ to detect comments containing offensive words and 
an easy-to-use ‘notice-and-takedown system’, which readers could use to report 
inappropriate comments. However, the First Section found that, although the filter was 
useful, it was ‘insufficient for preventing harm being caused to third parties’. Additionally, 
the First Section stressed that, although the ‘notice-and-takedown system’ was convenient 
for users, it had obviously failed in the present case since the impugned comments had 
continued to be accessible to the public for six weeks. The First Section attached no 
significance to the fact that the defamed person had refrained from using the ‘notice-and-
takedown system’, or to the fact that the comments were removed immediately after Delfi 
received a notice from said person’s lawyers.413 
In addition, the First Section noted that in 2006 Delfi had exercised a substantial degree of 
control over its comment platform. The First Section argued that Delfi had been ‘in a position 
                                                 
410 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5 
411 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5. 
412 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5, § 86. See also ARTICLE 19, ‘European Court strikes serious blow to free 
speech online’, Statement, 14 October 2013,  
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to know about an article to be published, to predict the nature of the possible comments 
prompted by it and, above all, to take technical or manual measures to prevent defamatory 
statements from being made public’. Unlike the authors, Delfi could also modify and delete 
the comments after they had been posted.414 The First Section argued that by choosing to 
allow comments by non-registered users, Delfi had assumed certain responsibility for 
them.415 Although the First Section noted that identifying and removing all defamatory 
statements is a laborious task, it stressed that it would be ‘an even more onerous task for a 
potentially injured person, who would be less likely to possess resources for continual 
monitoring of the Internet’.416 Furthermore, the First Section took the view that the fact that 
Delfi was obliged to pay the affected person 320 euros in non-pecuniary damages should by 
no means be regarded as a disproportionate penalty.417 Lastly, the First Section noted that 
the domestic courts had given Delfi considerable leeway in not requiring it to take any 
specific measures in order to avoid liability in the future.418 For all these reasons, the 
Chamber of the First Section of the Court unanimously ruled that Estonia had not breached 
the applicant’s Convention rights.  
Criticism 
The First Section judgment in Delfi received widespread criticism. For example, an article 
published in the Guardian stated that the judgment should ‘send a shiver of fear down any 
website operator’s spine’.419 Furthermore, the judgment was immediately analysed by, 
ARTICLE 19, an international organization specializing in freedom of expression issues. In 
its statement, ARTICLE 19 criticized the judgment as displaying ‘a worrying lack of 
understanding of the issues surrounding intermediary liability and the way in which the 
Internet works’, and called the judgement ‘a serious blow to freedom of expression 
online’.420 Dirk Voorhoof also commented on the case in the Strasbourg Observers, a blog 
that follows the case-law of the Court. According to these critics, the most controversial 
aspect of the First Section ruling is that it accepted the classification of Delfi as a ‘content 
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provider’ and not as an ‘intermediary internet service provider’ in relation to the user-
generated comments. As demonstrated above, this effectively qualifies Delfi as an editor of 
the comments with traditional editorial responsibilities. In his post for the Strasbourg 
Observers, Voorhoof stressed that this classification has far-reaching, negative 
consequences for online freedom of speech in general.421  
According to ARTICLE 19, the First Section’s biggest failure was overlooking the EU E-
Commerce Directive.422 In its statement, the organization claims that, in the light of Article 
14 of the Directive, platforms such as Delfi should be encouraged to remove illegitimate 
user-generated content upon notice, and their adherence should be rewarded with immunity 
from liability.423 Accordingly, these entities should only be faced with liability if they fail to 
take action upon notice. Moreover, according to ARTICLE 19, the First Section’s view that 
Delfi should have prevented the defamatory comments from being made public in the first 
place is incompatible with Article 15 of the Directive, which forbids the imposition of 
monitoring obligations on information society services.424 In addition, ARTICLE 19 
expressed its disappointment at the fact that the First Section ignored international standards 
developed, for example, by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
(hereinafter ‘the UN Special Rapporteur’) in his thematic report on the Internet.425 In this 
report, the UN Special Rapporteur clearly states that ‘censorship measures should never be 
delegated to private entities, and that no one should be held liable for content on the Internet 
of which they are not the author’.426  
The First Section’s implicit approval of ‘notice-and-takedown systems’ was also criticized. 
Voorhoof argued that such a system ‘reduces the monitoring process to a mere technical, 
non-transparent and very superficial interference with the right of freedom of expression in 
the online environment, with a clear risk of overbroad removal or blocking of online content 
protected according to Article 10 standards’.427 According to ARTICLE 19, the First 
                                                 
421 Voorhoof, Dirk, ‘Qualification of news portal as publisher of users’ comment may have far-reaching 
consequences for online freedom of expression: Delfi AS v. Estonia’, Strasbourg Observers, 25 October 2013, 
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/10/25/qualification-of-news-portal-as-publisher-of-users-comment-
may-have-far-reaching-consequences-for-online-freedom-of-expression-delfi-as-v-estonia/ >, 4 January 2015.  
422 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 41. 
423 See on this in Part II, Section 2.1.2 Liability under Additional Protocol and EU E-Commerce Directive. 
424 ARTICLE 19, ‘European Court strikes serious blow’, supra note 412. See Section 2.1.2 Liability under 
Additional Protocol and EU E-Commerce Directive. 
425 La Ru, Frank, Special Rapporteur, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression’, 16 May 2011, A/HRC/17/27. 
426 Ibid, § 43. 
427 Voorhoof, ‘Qualification of news portal as publisher of users’, supra note 421. 
77 
 
Section’s approval of these systems can even be seen more broadly as a recommendation for 
online ‘intermediaries’ to start pre-moderating their services, or to ultimately block the 
opportunity for user comments altogether. Finally, in its statement, ARTICLE 19 notes that, 
although Delfi paid relatively little as non-pecuniary damages, this should not have born any 
difference in the Court’s proportionality analysis. The imposing of non-pecuniary damages 
as such was a disproportionate interference with Delfi’s right to freedom of expression.428 
Not surprisingly, Delfi filed a request for referral of the case to the Grand Chamber. A total 
of 69 entities including media organizations, Internet companies, human rights groups and 
academic institutions supported the request.429 The Panel of the Grand Chamber accepted 
the request and gave permission to a number of organizations to file amicus curiae briefs.430  
Grand Chamber hearing 
The Grand Chamber hearing of Delfi AS v Estonia took place on 9 July 2014. During the 
oral hearing, the representatives of Delfi argued, first of all, that the news forum and its 
comment platform are two distinct parts of the same entity: the first represents the freedom 
of expression of the news portal operator, whereas the second represents that of the users. 
They argued that in this connection the news portal operator simply enables users to express 
themselves and, therefore, plays an ‘intermediary’ role. The lack of ‘editorial control’ over 
user-generated content is then balanced with user monitoring through, for example, reporting 
buttons. According to Delfi’s representatives, this essentially means that the responsibility 
of the traditional publisher is postponed until the publisher is aware of the relevant content. 
The representatives argued that this approach has been confirmed in the previously 
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mentioned Committee of Ministers 2003 Declaration and the EU E-Commerce Directive.431 
Accordingly, in their view, Delfi (as a news portal operator) should be regarded as an 
‘intermediary’ or a ‘host provider’ rather than as a publisher or a ‘content provider’.  
In response to this, the Government argued that Delfi is in fact asking the Court to re-
establish facts and law previously established by the domestic courts. According to the 
Government, the Court does not have competence to adopt views that differ from those of 
the domestic courts, who have thoroughly evaluated this case. Regarding the domestic 
courts’ decision to establish Delfi as a publisher, the Government stressed that the comments 
had formed a part of Delfi’s journalistic work: Delfi selected the topic of the article, titled it, 
and then invited users to comment on it. Moreover, in 2006, the comments section could be 
found directly under the article, and comments could be posted without registration, read 
without leaving Delfi’s webpage, and amended or deleted only by Delfi. In addition, Delfi 
had issued ‘house rules’ which users were asked to respect. The Government argued that this 
excludes the applicability of the EU E-Commerce Directive in this case since, as mentioned 
previously, according to its Recital 42, the Directive only covers cases where activity of the 
operator is limited to ‘mere technical, passive and automatic nature’. The Government also 
referred to the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), where the ECJ has ruled that 
domestic courts are best placed to decide on the question of whether an operator is to be 
regarded as a ‘mere host’.432 Accordingly, the law to be applied in this case was the Estonian 
civil law, which the domestic courts’ final ruling was rightly based on. However, it should 
be noted that the Judges of the Grand Chamber later asked questions from the Government 
regarding the foreseeability of the Estonian law in 2006 and today. This suggests that the 
Judges consider the possibility of finding a breach of the Convention rights due to lack of 
appropriate legislation.433 
In addition to re-establishing its status as an intermediary, Delfi also invited the Grand 
Chamber to take a stand regarding the measures recommended by the First Section. For one, 
Delfi stated that it considers pre-monitoring as a disproportionate requirement. Furthermore, 
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<http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hearings&w=6456909_09072014&language=lang&c=&py=2
014>, 3 January 2015. See also EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 41; and Declaration on freedom of 
communication on the Internet, supra note 37. 
432 See Google France and Google, joined cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 23 March 2010, § 119, and L’Oreal 
SA and Others v. eBay International AG and Others, C-324/09, 12 July 2011, § 117. 
433 See with this regard, for example, the aforementioned case of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, supra 
note 293. 
79 
 
the representatives of Delfi stressed that adopting a real name policy through which users 
could be identified would be an infringement of users’ rights per se.434Adopting such a policy 
as a self-regulatory measure might be acceptable, but it would be utterly disproportionate for 
a State to order its use.435 The Government agreed with this argument and noted that the 
operators, rather than the Government, should decide whether or not users are required to 
identify themselves. However, the Government stressed that Delfi should have taken 
measures to prevent or moderate unlawful comments because it must have known that the 
article could provoke such comments. It was disproportionate and unfair to place 
responsibility for monitoring the Internet on the potential victim. Furthermore, the 
Government noted that in connection to civil cases such as the present one, the authorities 
are not permitted to use the special investigative measures necessary for identifying 
anonymous commentators. Therefore, in these situations, the affected person cannot bring a 
case against the author or authors of the comments. In the Government’s view, this is not a 
failure attributable to the State. The Government fulfils its positive obligation to ensure the 
right to private life, following from Article 8 ECHR, by leaving it for the news portal owners 
to decide how to balance competing rights at stake; and by ensuring that if the owners fail, 
they can be held liable for any violations. Therefore, a private publishing house like Delfi 
could not expect to be free from liability when it had created a portal, where unidentified 
authors could post comments. In addition, the Government noted that Delfi has since taken 
steps to ensure better balance between Articles 8 and 10 ECHR, as required by the domestic 
courts. Therefore, the Government believes the domestic judgment in this case had not had 
any disproportionate implications on Delfi. Judges of the Grand Chamber also took particular 
interest in these measures adopted by Delfi, potentially suggesting that these might bare a 
role in their judgment.436  
Finally, when asked about its view on the more general implications of the Court’s ruling in 
this case, the Government stressed that the judgment will not affect, inter alia, social 
networking websites. The Government noted that both Delfi and the third parties had 
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suggested parallels between such websites, search engines, online auction websites, and 
Delfi. The Government, however, finds these parallels to be inappropriate, first of all, 
because on such websites users have control over their comments. In addition, the 
Government noted that on such websites users usually start new discussions, while on Delfi’s 
news portal this decision is always Delfi’s. Hence, in the Government’s view, the First 
Section judgment should not be regarded as imposing ‘strict liability’ on all online operators. 
It is based on the facts of this case and the active role of the online operator. Websites like 
Facebook or Twitter, on the other hand, would likely be regarded as passive operators, in 
other words as ‘intermediaries’ or ISPs. Delfi disagreed with this statement, arguing that if 
the ruling was upheld it would apply to news portals containing a comments platform, 
YouTube hosting third party videos, Blogger, as well as individual blogs allowing third-
party comments. In their concluding remarks, Delfi’s representatives stressed that the Court 
should follow the European consensus established in the ECJ case-law and several domestic 
judgments, and exclude service providers such as Delfi from liability.437 The case is still 
pending before the Grand Chamber. 
Author’s analysis 
In the light of the aforementioned, it seems clear that the most central (and controversial) 
element regarding media’s online liability for user-generated content is, in fact, the 
classifying of an entity as a ‘media actor’ (a ‘content provider’ or a publisher) in connection 
to such content. I first read the Delfi judgment in October 2013. Initially, I was strongly of 
the opinion that the First Section had erred in holding a news portal (Delfi) liable for the 
user-generated content. I agreed with the critics of the judgment, was pleased when the case 
was accepted to the Grand Chamber, and cheered for the applicant during the Grand 
Chamber hearing. However, during my research, I began to understand the Government’s 
arguments and the First Section’s argumentation. I still agree with Dirk Voorhoof, who noted 
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that classifying a news portal as a publisher rather than a passive ‘host’ to user-generated 
comments has far-reaching implications, and that to apply this interpretation as a general 
rule would be devastating from the perspective of online freedom of expression.438 However, 
when the circumstances of this specific case (in particular the actions of Delfi back in 2006) 
are examined closely – and this is the case-by-case analysis the Court conducts – the First 
Section ruling does not seem to suggest such an interpretation. 
First of all, the Government is correct when it states that the Court has no authority to change 
the domestic courts’ interpretation of the national law if they have conducted a balanced 
analysis of the case. In this case, the domestic courts analysed the applicability of the EU E-
Commerce Directive, but came to the conclusion that it was not applicable. I consider it to 
be proven that before this conclusion they had thoroughly analysed Delfi’s activities 
concerning its comment platform and taken the view that, at the time, Delfi was not a ‘mere 
host’ in the meaning of the EU E-Commerce Directive (or the Committee of Ministers 
Declaration on freedom of communication).439 The key element in this regard was that the 
authors lost all control of their comments as soon as they had been posted. Delfi was the only 
one able to modify the posted comments, and it used the ‘automatic filter’ and the ‘notice-
and-takedown system’ to do this. Thus, Delfi had the sole power to decide which comments 
were published. In the light of all the aforementioned, I feel the domestic courts correctly 
concluded that Delfi had practiced ‘editorial control’ over its comment platform and was, 
therefore, to be regarded as a ‘content provider’ or a publisher of the comments. It was held 
liable because the measures it had adopted in order to comply with its responsibilities had, 
indisputably, failed to achieve their purpose.440 This ruling is in line with the principles 
adopted in the Court’s case-law regarding printed media cases.441 
Thus, in my view, this case does not set any general principles identifying all online news 
platforms as publishers of their comment sections.442 It is just another ruling that must be 
analysed in the light of its specific circumstances. I hypothesize that the Grand Chamber will 
                                                 
438 Voorhoof, ‘Qualification of news portal as publisher of users’, supra note 421. 
439 EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 41; and Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet, 
supra note 37. See analysis in Part II, Section 2.2 Standard-Setting Texts. 
440 This ruling resembles a lot the one taken by the US court in the aforementioned case of Stratton Oakmont 
v. Prodigy, supra note 85, where the court concluded that by active utilization of technology and man power 
to delete wrongful messages, Prodigy had acquired editorial control of the published content. See with this 
regard Introduction, Section 2.2.2 Approach to liability for user misuse, Emergence of case-law. 
441 See with regard to classical media the cases of Gündüz v. Turkey, supra note 137; and Sürek v. Turkey 
(No.1), supra note 142. 
442 In fact, noting the changes made in its business model, it is possible that also Delfi would not be regarded 
as a publisher nowadays. 
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come to the same conclusion as the First Section, provided that it does not let itself be 
influenced by the large amount of publicity surrounding this case.443 If this prediction came 
true, I hope the Grand Chamber is cautious in wording its judgment and binds it to the 
specific circumstances of this case to prevent attempts to apply it expansively. Furthermore, 
I hope the Grand Chamber notes the several standard-setting texts adopted by the Council, 
and emphasizes the possible problems inherent to the application of ‘reporting buttons’ and 
‘automatic filtering systems’ endorsed by the First Section. When applied correctly, these 
measures can be useful, but attention must be paid to the risks they pose in the form of private 
censorship. I would also welcome a statement from the Court further encouraging Member 
States to co-operate with ISPs and other stakeholders in order to clarify liability issues and 
to further discussions on the adaption and applicability of different monitoring methods. 
Now it is left for me to assess how these principles can be applied with regard to ‘cyber hate’ 
cases.  
                                                 
443 This has happened before, for example, in the case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, 
[GC] March 2011, where the Grand Chamber overturned the Chamber ruling after the case attracted similar 
kind of publicity and several interventions also by Member States. The other reservation I have to make 
regarding this hypothesis concerns the question posed by the Grand Chamber as to whether the law at the 
relevant time in Estonia was predictable enough for Delfi to foresee it would be held liable for its actions. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHO IS (NOT) LIABLE FOR CYBER HATE? 
My focus throughout this research has been the liability for user-generated ‘cyber hate’. In 
Part I, I concluded that the Council has committed itself to the combat against ‘hate speech’. 
In Part II, I discovered that this commitment has also extended to ‘cyber hate’. Regarding 
liability, I found out that the actions of some online operators might justify the drawing of 
parallels between them and representatives of the classical media. Traditionally, the Court 
has held these representatives liable for disseminating third-party-content involving ‘hate 
speech’. However, the lack of ‘cyber hate’ cases forced me to rely on standard setting texts 
and principles established in connection to other cases involving the Internet. When 
analysing the defamation case Delfi AS v. Estonia, I came to the conclusion that under 
specific circumstances it is acceptable to define a news portal operator as a ‘content provider’ 
or a publisher of user-generated content it hosts, and, therefore, to impose liability on it.444 
The key element to be analysed is the operator’s direct ‘editorial control’ of the content. This 
excludes the applicability of both the EU E-Commerce Directive and the Committee of 
Ministers 2003 Declaration, which apply only to ‘intermediary’ ISPs, and, with regard to 
‘hate speech’ offences, of the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention.445 
However, it is important to highlight a central element that differentiates the case of Delfi 
from ‘cyber hate’ cases. This is the fact that, according to the rules and principles adopted 
in the framework of the Council, Member States should have criminalized acts involving 
publication and dissemination of ‘cyber hate’. Moreover, as was established by the Court in 
the case of K.U. v. Finland, from the positive obligations inherent to Article 8 ECHR it 
follows that it is not enough for a Member State to criminalize certain actions, but it must 
also ‘reinforce the deterrent effect of criminalisation by applying criminal law provisions in 
practice through effective investigation and prosecution’.446 Accordingly, the anonymity of 
authors of ‘cyber hate’ – bloggers, private website owners, or even news portal 
commentators – does not prevent primary responsibility from being imposed on them. 
Nevertheless, I believe that wider imposing of liability is necessary for the fight against ‘hate 
speech’ to be effective. Accordingly, the possibility to impose liability on authors of 
impugned content should not exclude the additional liability being imposed on entities that 
facilitate its publication. It is at this stage that the principles adopted in the case of Delfi enter 
                                                 
444 Delfi AS v. Estonia, supra note 5. 
445 Additional Protocol, supra note 313; EU E-Commerce Directive, supra note 41 ; and Declaration on 
freedom of communication on the Internet, supra note 37. 
446 K.U. v. Finland, supra note 34, § 46. 
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the picture. As stated above, according to the Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Cybercrime, imposing liability on a service provider acting as a ‘mere conduit’ requires 
evidence of the ISP’s criminal intent.447 However, as in the case of Delfi, also in ‘cyber hate’ 
cases it can be argued that an entity that has ‘editorial control’ over user-generated content 
is more than a ‘mere conduit’. The existence of such control has been enough to establish 
liability in classic ‘hate speech’ cases.448 Noting the importance granted to the fight against 
‘cyber hate’ in the work of the Council and, provided that the First Section judgment in the 
case of Delfi is not overruled, I see no reason why this approach could not be applied to user-
generated ‘cyber hate’ content.  
Moreover, imposing liability on ‘content providers’ only when they exercise sufficient 
amount of ‘editorial control’, risks ‘content providers’ not practising such control altogether. 
Allowing such ‘wilful blindness’ would be detrimental to the fight against ‘cyber hate’. 
Accordingly, I endorse imposing a wider ‘duty of diligence’ on these entities. And I would 
go even further. In my opinion, this principle should also be applied to some extent to ISPs 
enjoying the ‘limited liability regime’ established in the Additional Protocol. Of course, as 
stated above, any liabilities imposed on these actors must be carefully delimited and 
balanced according to the functions of the specific entity. Furthermore, they must be in 
conformity with the established rules and principles. Therefore, for example, ISPs cannot be 
obligated to monitor conduct on their services. However, a discussion could be started with 
all the relevant private sector actors in order to agree on some voluntary measures from 
which both ‘content providers’ and ISPs could select the self-regulatory measures most 
suitable for them. As in the case of Delfi, liability would then only arise if the operator failed 
to prevent or respond to infringements that it reasonably could have addressed. In the 
aforementioned General Conclusions, ECRI recommends measures such as blocking 
websites entailing impugned content, adaption of filtering systems, and refusing 
anonymity.449 However, as has been noted in many of the Council’s standard-setting texts, 
in order for these monitoring measures to be adopted correctly (and to avoid the risk of undue 
self-censorship), further education of online operators is needed.450 Moreover, this co-
                                                 
447 Explanatory Report to Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 314, § 45. 
448 See the aforementioned cases of Sürek v. Turkey (No.1), supra note 142; and Gündüz v. Turkey, supra note 
137, discussed in Part I, Section 3.4.2 Media’s liability for opinions of others. 
449 General Conclusions, ‘Legal Instruments to Combat Racism on the Internet’, supra note 395, § 6. 
450 With this regard, I am happy to note the amount of publicity gained by the Council’s Youth Department’s 
‘No Hate Speech Movement: Campaign of Young People for Human Rights Online’ aiming at raising 
awareness of young people about ‘cyber hate’. See Youth Department of the Council of Europe, European 
85 
 
operation should not be limited to European entities. To tackle problems caused by the 
‘American Safe Haven’, ECRI recommends starting an international discussion on measures 
to counter racist sites with all online operators.451 I agree with this recommendation, and the 
positive effects of such co-operation can already be seen in the voluntary actions of Yahoo! 
in the aforementioned case concerning the sale of Nazi memorabilia.452  
In the light of all aforementioned, I think I have found an answer to my question, and in the 
end it is quite simple. In my opinion, the correct answer is that all the actors taking actively 
part in the dissemination of ‘cyber hate’ should be liable for it. The key word is ‘actively’. 
In the diagram presented at the beginning of this research, this could mean all the specified 
entities depending on the amount of ‘editorial control’ they have over the information 
published or transmitted through their services. While the author of the impugned content 
should always be held liable (when the essential elements of an offense are met), the entity 
publishing this content is liable if it should have addressed it. Furthermore, an entity merely 
hosting or providing access to the content avoids liability if it has complied with its 
respective ‘duty of diligence’. Naturally, in order to adopt this approach, the responsibilities 
of respective online operators should be outlined with more precision. However, this is 
outside the scope of this research. In sum, the finding of my analysis is simply that in order 
for the fight against ‘hate speech’ to be effective, online operators should not be allowed to 
turn a blind eye to ‘cyber hate’ blooming on their services. Nonetheless, any actions taken 
with this regard must respect the inherent principles of Article 10 of the Convention. 
                                                 
Youth Centre, ‘No Hate Speech Movement: Campaign of Young People for Human Rights Online’, campaign 
website, available at <http://www.nohatespeechmovement.org/campaign>, 11 January 2015. 
451 General Conclusions, ‘Legal Instruments to Combat Racism on the Internet’, supra note 395, § 6. 
452 See on this Part II, Section 1.2 Additional Challenge: American safe haven. 
